THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY

COLLEGE OF SOCIAL SCIENCES AND PUBLIC POLICY

PROGRESSIVE ARAB NATIONALISM: 1952-1958

THE WAR OF POSITION, LAND REFORM, ANTI-COLONIALISM AND THE ARAB "*EFFENDIYYA*"

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A Thesis submitted to the
Program in International Affairs
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Master of Arts

Degree Awarded:
Spring Semester , 2012

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank everyone who has been with me throughout this process, not just through writing my thesis but through my college experience. It is obvious I need to thank my mom and dad for their support, encouragement and the spirit of asking questions that they instilled in me. If it was not for my parents I would have never made it this far and I am grateful that they support my decision to pursue a graduate degree. I would also like to mention my Major Professor Dr. Peter Garretson who has always kept my spirits up and never let me waver as I dove into a project that I really did not know how hard it would be. I would like to thank my roommates and friends who were there for support when I needed it and never quite let me lose my mind.

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ABSTRACT

Progressive Arab nationalism was built upon a concept of emancipation. Emancipating states from imperialism, peasants from feudalism and creating truly independent and sovereign states. From 1952 to 1958, Arab nationalists aimed to free themselves from Western imperialism created by the presence of Western institutions, regimes and organizations in their lands that were used to project power and protect economic interests. The geographies and politics of Arab states were created as a method for Western powers to maintain their interests in the region. One such case was the concentration of ownership of land within a feudal class that served the world market. Progressive Arab nationalist institutions such as governments, political parties, newspapers, radio programs, schools and social movements were the motor of social change in the traditional Arab monarchies. These institutions represented civil society the domain of the new Arab "*effendiyya."* Starting during the 1930s, Arab civil society fought a war of position against the hegemonic power of the traditional Arab monarchies and ultimately succeeded in establishing progressive Arab nationalist hegemony in Egypt, Jordan and Iraq

INTRODUCTION: BRITISH IMPERIALISM AND ARAB NATIONALIST REACTIONS.

The story of Egypt's anti-colonial foreign policy in the early Nasserist era was the end of an epoch in Anglo-Arab relations, Britain had been expanding its hold on Arab lands since the occupation of Egypt in 1882 and it solidified many gains in the wake of the First World War. Britain was given a large continuous swath of land from the Persian Gulf to the Mediterranean by the League of Nations, this region would eventually become the independent states of Israel, Jordan and Iraq. British interests in Arab lands after the First World War were apparent, the exploration, transportation and refining of ever more crucial crude oil.

But what is particularly interesting, is that though Britain "controlled" these Mandates by the League of Nations, all of these were theoretically self-governing entities. This was also the case with Egypt during the long occupation, even though Egypt was made a British protectorate from 1914-1922. But none of the Arab regions of the Middle East had ever come into the British Empire in the sense of the dominions, colonies of white settlement (Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa). Which raises a question of how to define what, how and why the British Empire expanded as it did, in such a seemingly nonlinear and aleatoric fashion.

With the question of British involvement and more so consolidation of hegemony in the core of the Arab World had occurred from 1882-1919, one more question should be asked; what were the reactions by Arabs to foreign control of their lands? In many ways British hegemony had only replaced Ottoman administration, and by the end of the Ottoman era nationalism had entered the ideological and political discussions within the empire, inspired by the first and second Ottoman constitutional eras.

Arab nationalism and especially pan-Arabism were the most politically salient position taken by newly freed and triumphant Arabs, in the wake of the Hashemite revolt against Ottoman forces in the Hejaz, Aqaba and the taking of Damascus by Faisal, the leader of the Arab revolt. But Arab joy would soon be doused by the political reality of the post-war Anglo-French settlement and the imposition of new League of Nations mandates therefore no pan-Arab state was created. The British as mentioned above first desired these Arab lands for their natural resources and exploited them as such. As a result of this, Arab nationalists emerged out of the Second World War with an irredentist desire of accomplishing the pan-Arab goal foiled by the San Remo conference and the fragmentation of the Arab nation into what were seen as artificial states.

Another major intellectual current in Arab nationalism after the Second World War was the opposition by newly well-educated middle class intellectuals to the exploitation of their countrymen by "feudal" lords. Arab "*effendis"* opposed "feudalism" on the basis of social justice and the belief in modernization of agricultural method. They believed that progressive land reform policies would improve the lives of the *fellahin* and make the national agricultural economies more efficient and just.

CHAPTER 1: HISTORIOGRAPHY

Questions of Empire

Gallagher *and Robinson, Informal Empire and the Official* Mind.

There are four men that any historiography for the causes of British imperialism must mention they are Ronald Robinson, John Gallagher, A.G. Hopkins and P.J. Cain. Robinson and Gallagher put together two impressive works one an article "The Imperialism of Free Trade" published in *The Economic History Review* in 1953[1]. While their other major work on imperialism, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism's second edition was released in 1981[2] While Hopkins and Cain have released one massive book on the history of British overseas expansion simply titled British Imperialism: 1688-2000, its second edition was released in 2002 [3]

To start at the beginning, Gallagher and Robinson' first define what they mean by the "formal" and "informal" British Empire during the nineteenth century. They cite the orthodox view of nineteenth century imperial history that the Empire was "laid down on the racial and legalistic concept which inspired the Imperial Federation movement."4 Robinson and Gallagher cite Egerton and Seeley as historians who viewed the "formal" empire as the "only test of imperial activity" and regarded it as an "empire of kinship and constitutional dependence as an

1 GALLAGHER, JOHN. August 01, 1953. THE IMPERIALISM OF FREE TRADE. *The Economic history review* 6, no. 1, (accessed October 4, 2011)

2 Robinson, Ronald Edward, John Gallagher, and Alice Denny. *Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism*. London: Macmillan, 1981

3Cain, P. J., and A. G. Hopkins. *British Imperialism, 1688-2000*. Harlow, England: Longman, 2002.

4 Gallagher, p.1

organism of with its own laws of growth."5

On the other hand, Gallagher and Robinson, cite theorists such as Lenin and Hobson who expounded upon an entirely different view of British Imperialism. This thesis makes imperialism the "highest stage of capitalism" and the inevitable conclusion of a policy of foreign investment especially in the period after 1880.6 But ironically, the anti-Federationists, only proved their opponents contention by proving that the character of British imperialism after 1880 was "a qualitative change in the nature of British expansion and a sharp deviation from the innocent and static liberalism of the middle of the century."7 Both schools ultimately came to the same conclusion on the matter of British expansion overseas, that "indifference" and "enthusiasm" for Empire in the second six decades of the nineteenth century relied on the rise and fall of belief in free trade. With the period between 1840 to about 1870 being the time of imperial "indifference" and the last three decades of the nineteenth century the period of "enthusiasm" for empire. Robinson and Gallagher point out the central fallacy with this thesis, by showing both the width and breadth of imperial activity, if not formal conquest, in the middle of the nineteenth century; with Britain extending its control in South and West Africa, the East Indies, the Indian Subcontinent and in the Pacific.[8] This evidence assails the central point of the orthodox historians of the formal empire, proving that the common wisdom was far from the truth and that in both the anti-Imperialist mid-century and in the last three decades there was "a continuity of policy which the conventional interpretation misses because it takes account only of formal

5Ibid.

6Gallager, p.2

7Ibid.

8 Ibid, p.3

methods of control."[9] Robinson and Gallagher point out in this article where they find the biggest fault in the historiography of the British Empire in nineteenth century, in the so-called orthodox view, which only focused on the formal and ignored the informal empire. As they proved there was a massive expansion of the informal empire in the period 1840-1870, which contradicts the orthodox view and sets up their own argument.

Robinson and Gallagher, in their own thesis define imperialism as a,

> "sufficient political function of this process of integrating new regions into the expanding economy; its character is largely decided by the various and changing relationships between the political and economic elements of expansion in any particular region and time."[10]

They gave two caveats to this definition, first imperialism maybe only indirectly related to economic development and go beyond it in order to protect its strategic function and second although imperialism is a function of economic development it is not a necessary function.[11] They further expand this by explaining that the relationship between security and economic interests are correlated. The integration of states, into the empire, with strong political institutions and thus the ability to protect commercial interests, preclude the necessity for armed intervention and vice versa.[12] Robinson and Gallagher ultimately concluded in their thesis that both formal and informal empire were variable political functions of the extending pattern of overseas trade, investment, migration and culture.[13] Meaning that the *a priori* labels, of formal and informal are "interconnected and interchangeable," making both the orthodox view and the

9Ibid, p.3.

10 Ibid p5-6

11Ibid, p.6

12Ibid, p.6

13Ibid, p.6

Hobsonian/Leninist views on empire essentially meaningless

Gallagher and Robinson's other major work that contributed to understanding British imperialism was their work on the "Scramble for Africa," Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism. In it, Gallagher and Robinson introduce the concept of the "official mind" of the British Empire. Essential to understanding the "official mind" is to also understand the ideological and political environment in which Victorian policy-makers and bureaucrats existed in. "The Victorians regarded themselves as the leaders of civilisation, as pioneers of industry and progress."[14] As the first line of Africa and the Victorians, it sets up the idea that industrial production was one of the most important factors for the growth and success of the Victorian economy and along with civilization and progress is what differentiated Victorian Britain from the rest of the world. But more important than the power of industrial growth and development was the ideological force that compelled Victorian Britain to expand, in essence, a belief in liberalism. Robinson and Gallagher cite that Victorians believed in letting enterprise go from the hands of the state to let people believe, pray, invest, accumulate capital and practice self-help, in short either Benthamite or Cobdenite liberalism. And as liberals they "agreed the government that governed least governed best."[15] They further believed that expansion was a "moral duty to the rest of humanity" and as Lord Palmerston put in a speech in 1842,

> it is that the exchange of commodities may be accompanied by the diffusion of knowledge – by the interchange of mutual benefit engendering mutual kind feelings... it is, that commerce may go freely forth leading civilizations with one hand , and peace with the other to render mankind happier, wiser, better. With arrogant presumptuous folly, the dealers in restrictive duties fly, fettering the inborn energies of man and setting up their miserable legislation instead of the great standing laws of

14Robinson et al p.1

15Ibid p.2

nature. [16]

This was the actual world view of many in the mid-Victorian world "suffused with a vivid sense of superiority and self-righteousness, if with every good intention," the Victorians also believed in a "ladder of progress" determined by the capacity of each region for "freedom and enterprise." In the mind of the Victorians, expansion did not only seem natural and necessary, but it was an inevitable, preordained and correct enterprise.[17]

But more importantly this idea of expansion "was not essentially a matter of empire but of private commerce and influence." Expansion was first and foremost a private impetus taken up by private interests, in the Victorian mind, empire was thought of as supporting, protecting and providing opportunities for the expansion of private interests much like the liberal state at home. [18] Victorians, also thought, that expansion along with peace and a concern for liberal reform would bring together the peoples of the world and launch the peoples of Africa and the Orient out of "feudalism" and quickly move towards liberalism forming a "Great Commercial Republic."[19]

But no matter how liberal Victorian politicians were in their statements, the amount of government involvement never decreased. Although the Cobdenites believed that "the exercise of power interfered with the growth of trade," practical statesmen found that the two could very well work together. The Palmerstonians believed that the growing economy needed the

16Ibid p.2

17Ibid p.3

18Ibid p.3

19Ibid p.3-4

protection of power, and that it also was also one of the weapons of power, Palmerstonians and Canningites exerted their strength to bring about political conditions favoring liberalism and commercial interests, by sponsoring revolutions in Greece, Belgium and South America.[20] The Victorians believed that "power must break open the world to free trade" before the collaborating classes could start their work, in short, free trade could be expanded from Central Asia to South America by the use of power in its subtler forms "prestige, cajolery, threat, the dangled loan reinforced occasionally with blockade, bombardment or expedition."[21] By the 1870s, the British government had little need for but a "few tiresome exertions of power or Downing street rule," in regions where self-interest and understanding joined; which made the independent American republics and self-governing British colonials the best partners in the Victorians world mission, proving trade and influence superior to direct imperial control.[22]

Robinson and Gallagher ask a question. Are the reasons for British expansion into Africa during the 1880s so numerous that there cannot be a single answer to their question? Their answer is that there must be a "unified field of study where all possible incentives to African empire may be assembled without becoming indistinguishable in their several effects." They answer that the study of the field of policy-making is where "all the conditions for expansion were brought together.[23]

Four reasons are given for British expansion into Africa during the 1880s. The first factor in creating British policy vis-à-vis Africa during the 1880s was that the choices of statesmen

20 Ibid p.4

21Ibid p.5

22Ibid p.7-8

23Ibid p 19-20

were not merely “mechanical choices of expedients,” but the reality was that they were prejudiced about their beliefs about the role of government, morals, politics and the order of society and international relations. Statesmen also saw themselves as above the fray, being mediators and charged with taking a long and wide view of the situation and to ultimately serve the interests of the nation and not of businesses, philanthropists or the or the general population.[24]

A second factor in the creation of the British African policy lay in their physical detachment from Africa and the conditions on the ground, with the “official idea” and the “African reality” often being very different. With historical notions, concepts of international legality and aristocratic codes of honor playing a large role in their decision-making.25 Finally, Joseph Schumpeter's idea that official thinking in itself was a reason for British imperialism in the late Victorian period, which is to say, that along with a physical empire, British rulers had gained experience of how to bring that empire together. The great departments of State and the Indian Service had as Robinson and Gallagher called it “compiled special historiographies of their own,” along with ideas of the national interest, supremacy and world security.26 These factors together, comprised the so-called “official mind” of British imperialism, what is interesting is the role that, ideas and experience played in creating British imperial policy in the late Victorian era. How a devotion to liberal ideas conflicted with political realities, domestic, international, colonial, and ultimately interfered with the liberal imperial project.

Robinson and Gallagher's two major contributions to the literature, free trade as

24Ibid p.20

25Ibid p.21

26Ibid p.21

imperialism and the idea of the "official mind" go a long way to explaining a number of the causes for British expansion in the late Victorian period after 1850. Free trade was a policy tailor-made for supporting British interests in the late Victorian period. As it stressed many of Britain's strengths in many fields especially in commerce, banking and in both naval and commercial shipping power and a wish to expand the reaches of the informal empire into as of them undeveloped and unexplored markets such as the Ottoman Empire and China. This thesis situated the informal empire as the more important locus of British imperial activity, after all "over half of Britain's investment overseas and two-thirds of her imports went outside regions colored red on the map."[27] Furthermore, the "official mind" of the British government had accumulated much data on how to acquire an informal empire on the way to the 1880s. Where informal empire and Palmerstonian economic and imperial policy had been successful in increasing British presence in South Africa, the Americas and had made attempts at cracking the "Orient" open to free trade and Victorian progress, although its success in doing so was questionable.

Hopkins and Cain:

Gentlemanly Capitalism, the City of London and Overseas Expansion.

Hopkins and Cain emphasize a conception of the British economy during the nineteenth century, which puts less emphasis on the Industrial Revolution, and the older heroic conception of it. It also rejects a newer growth oriented model, which tends to equate development with industrialization.[28] While they don't deny that Britain created the first Industrial Revolution, what they argue is that non-industrial forms of capitalism, particularly those in finance and commerce

27Ibid p.8

28Hopkins and Cain p.35-36

have not received the attention they deserve. Hopkins and Cain, stress that the wealth of the financial and service sectors came from land and from trade in goods other than British manufactured exports, which stayed productive, even after the relative decline off British industry.[29] Hopkins and Cain stress in this first part the capitalism factor of their gentlemanly capitalism thesis in the following section they expand on they meant by the British Gentleman.

"The English gentleman was made as well as born," while being born into the gentle class gave an unmatched advantage, the benefit of time, one could also be initiated into the Gentlemanly order. The English Gentleman placed duty before self-advancement, his rules of conduct were Christian as well as feudal and his rank entitled him to be a knight or an officer in "the vanguard of Christ's army."[30] Young gentlemen passed through a long process of education designed to meld social and religious values and to place men into command positions which allowed them sufficient leisure "to practice the gentlemanly arts, namely leadership, light administration and competitive sports." Another facet of the gentlemanly class was they held production in low repute, as working directly for money, as opposed to making it indirectly was "associated with dependence and cultural inferiority."[31] Although these gentlemen looked down on productive work, they still had an "ambivalent attitude to capitalism," expressed by the values of the landed aristocracy which would remain the dominant social class in Britain until late in the nineteenth century. The first important form of capitalism in Britain was rentier capitalism which grew out of feudal tradition and the gentry's willingness to "embrace a market philosophy.[32] Up

29Hopkins and Cain, p.36

30Ibid, p.38

31Ibid, p.38-39

32 Ibid, p.39

to the nineteenth century the landed class still controlled the traditional levers of power and was the most successful elements of the new British capitalism. Moreover, the more a career or a source of income allowed for a lifestyle similar that of the landed elite, the higher prestige it conferred.[33] And as such, occupations in the services sector along with those which lined up with the Weberian view of "entrepreneurial" wealth, especially those not associated with manufacturing fit well with the gentlemanly ideal. The City of London became a major center of gentlemanly capitalism which "exercised a disproportionate influence on British economic life and economic policy," additionally, up to the twentieth century, the City created fortunes larger than those created in industry.[34] The great leaders of the service sector, lived in the City, close to the center of political power, which allowed them to have the lifestyle needed to cultivate the social connections that were a vital part of their success in business.

Hopkins and Cain quite ably explain what they mean by gentlemanly capitalism but as of yet they haven't expounded on the reasons that the gentlemanly capitalist order led to British imperialism and expansion. Hopkins and Cain say that:

> the imperial mission was the export version of the gentlemanly order…the gentlemanly code appeared in bolder format abroad…empire was the ultimate testing ground for the idea of responsible progress, for the battle against evil, for the performance of duty and for the achievement of honor.[35]

This is the biggest conflict between the "official mind" and the Gentlemanly Capitalist views of the imperial enterprise. Robinson and Gallagher in *Africa and the Victorians,*

33 Ibid, p.40

34 Ibid p.41

35 Ibid, p.47

emphasized the importance of liberalism and of a triumphant view of Victorian Britain as the vanguard of the world, leading the world from feudalism and backwardness to a great liberal utopia. While Hopkins and Cain bring up that imperialism was an opportunity to implement "responsible progress" and "the performance of duty." How could two thesis referring to the same point in history differ so much in their definition for the values couched in the "imperial mission"?

Africa and the Victorians and the "The Imperialism of Free Trade" were both published in the height of the Cold War, 1961 and 1953 respectively and Robinson and Gallagher used an explanatory tool which put liberalism and free trade as the best Western values to transfer to Africa and Asia. While the first edition of *British Imperialism* published in 1993 jettisoned much of the liberal language and ideology and tried to move the discussions of empire into a much less value-laden direction and to explain causes as they were in their own context.

What does imperialism mean for Hopkins and Cain? They define it as "a species of the genus expansion." They also say that what makes imperialism distinct is not that it takes certain economic, political or cultural forms but that "it involves an incursion or attempted incursion, into the sovereignty of another state"[36] Hopkins and Cain defined imperialism "as a process of transmitting impulses from a particular source of energy." And as such, gentlemanly capitalism was without doubt a force that helped to promote expansionist forces of investment, commerce and migration throughout the world. They say that development and international free trade were to be financed, handled, insured and transported by British firms and through the City of

36 Ibid p.54

London.[37]

The major contribution of the gentlemanly capitalism thesis is its decoupling of the Industrial Revolution and British overseas expansion in the nineteenth century. The authors stress other non-industrial forms of capitalism as being more important to British expansion such as the connection between the landed gentry and the City. This relationship proved to be a major theme throughout the nineteenth century. Although the ideas of Robinson and Gallagher and that of Hopkins and Cain have little in common for explaining the reasons for British imperial expansion in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, they agree on one important point, the existence of what Robinson and Gallagher coined the "informal empire," the parts not colored red on the map.

This discussion of imperialism, free trade, liberalism and financial dominance will become important later in the definition of the milieu in which Egypt and the Hashemite Arab states existed in the world-system after the Second World War. Britain and her Arab allies had asserted themselves as the hegemonic power in both economic and military matters and unsurprisingly, this hegemonism led to more antagonism to British economic and strategic aims in the region by nationalist forces.

The Question of Arab Nationalism: The Development of the Historiography

Israel Gershoni in his article "Rethinking the Formation of Arab Nationalism in the Middle East, 1920-1945: Old and New Narratives" works to give a systematic historiography of Arab Nationalism in the interwar period. He begins by citing an "old narrative" of Arab

37 Ibid, p.55

nationalism given by scholars such as Albert Hourani, Elie Kedourie and Sylvia G. Haim. These historians emphasized that the end of World War I, the collapse of the Ottoman empire and the creation of French and British mandates and more specifically the 1930s as the moment when "a mature ideology of Arab nationalism took shape."[38] Gershoni also emphasizes that under the old narrative, Arab Nationalism was seen "above all as an idea," and that the writers of the old school explored the ideas of thinkers, theoreticians, writers and shapers of Arab nationalism such as Sati al 'Husri, Qustantin Zurayq and Edmond Rabbath. The old narrative put Arab language as the "central feature of Arab nationalist ideology," while history was a close ally and auxiliary of language and its goal was to revive a "golden age" and to bring back "classical Arab glory" as a path to national rebirth.[39] According to Gershoni, the role of Islam was "secularized. Modernized and nationalized," by modern writers attempting to fit it to the post religious nature of Arab nationalism, making it another component to build up the Arab nation.[40] Another major facet of Arab nationalism put forward by the old school was that Arab nationalism "radiated from a European center to a Middle Eastern periphery," and adopted the German idealism of Herder and Fichte, as well as the Romanticism of the "pan"-nationalist movements of Central and Eastern Europe. [41] Finally, Gershoni says that the old narrative paid very little attention to on the ground sociopolitical issues, such as the dissemination of these ideas to a non-intellectual elite connecting "idea and praxis" of Arab nationalism in political mind and the policies of Arab

38 Jankowski, James P., and I. Gershoni. *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*. New York: Columbia University Press, 1997. P. 22

39 Gershoni, p.23

40 Ibid. p.24

41 Ibid

governments.[42]

On the other hand the proponents of the new narrative of Arab nationalism, move Arab nationalism "from the periphery to center" examining it from the perspective of each separate Arab state or society. Another major movement and innovation of the new narrative was to view nationalism as "a multidimensional historical movement closely connected with social and economic changes, political and institutional developments and the specific sociopolitical context of each Arab society individually and all of them together as a cultural unit."[43] Making the protagonists of Arab nationalism not ideas or their proponents, but rather national movements, official and unofficial parties, organizations, economic forces, state systems and institutions; they further subscribed to methodological ideas of the Annales school of social history, world systems theory and political economy, and the relationship between power, wealth, society and economy.[44] Famous writers in the new school include William Cleveland and Bassam Tibi, who both wrote significant works on the life and ideologies of the of the influential Arab nationalist educator Sati al-'Husri.[45]

The new narrative has in common with the old the significance of the end of the Ottoman empire and the subsequent searching for a "new communal identity" based on Arab history, culture and language as a way to make the Arab nation "viable in the post-Ottoman world." Along with the narrative of struggle against European imperialism and its imposition of "regionalism" of the Mandatory system and stressing schemes of Arab unity as ways of gaining

42 Ibid p24-26

43 Ibid. p27

44 Ibid.

45 Ibid, p.28

political influence.[46] Finally, the scholars in the new narrative, explore the socioeconomic bases for the spread and rise of Arab Nationalism during the inter war years. Historians explored the role of a larger urban, middle class (the *effendiyya)*, their radicalization and the establishing of pan-Arab organizations such as the Iraqi Muthanna Club and the Syrian League of National Action and the concurrent development of an Arab nationalist press.[47] Most importantly for this paper is the role that Egypt's newly radicalized Arab nationalist *effendiyya* and its interest on Palestine's Arab revolt of 1936 brought Egypt into to a position of supporting Arab unity and bringing Egypt into the Arab world.[48]

Sati al-'Husri, the Architect of Pan-Arab Nationalism: The German Cultural Nationalist Tradition and the Importance of Education.

Adeed Dawisha in his book's Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair, introductory chapter does much to explain both the ideological and political ascent of Arab nationalism in the first half of the twentieth century by exploring the role of Sati al-'Husri's thought in the movement's development.[49] Dawisha in his own historiographical discussion at the beginning of Arab Nationalism, introduces Benedict Anderson's idea of nation as an imagined community, as used by Israel Gershoni and James Jankowski in their book *Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945.*[50] Dawisha quotes Anderson

46 Ibid, p.28-29

47 Ibid, p.31-34

48 Ibid

49 Dawisha, A. I. *Arab Nationalism in the Twentieth Century: From Triumph to Despair*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 2003.

50Gershoni, I., and James P. Jankowski. *Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930-1945*. Cambridge: Cambridge

> It is imagined because the members of even the smallest nations will never know most of their fellow members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of communion... [It] is imagined as a community, because regardless of the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each, the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal comradeship.[51]

Dawisha cites the attraction of the Andersonian view of nationalism to Jankowski and Gershoni as they write in a response to the review of their above book by Charles D. Smith.[52] Jankowski and Gershoni's attraction to Anderson's view of nationalism was precisely its "cultural-semiotic nature", its "imagined' character." and as such a cultural construct that could exist without the state as necessary agent.[53]

Dawisha in the third chapter of *Arab Nationalism* sketches out Sati al-'Husri's theory of Arab nationalism and the debt it owes to the ideas and authors of German romantic nationalism such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte and Johann Gottfried Herder.[54] The German nationalists focused on the idea of *volk* as the defining feature of their nationalist sentiment as per Herder. "The *volk* was not simply the people of a country, but a metaphysical entity defined relationally as that which produces a particular, art, culture, set of great me, religion and collection of

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University Press, 1995.

51Dawisha, p.5

52Jankowski and Gershoni and Charles Smith engaged in a series of responses to each other on the issue of imagined communities and the book supra in note 50. they are Smith, CD. November 01, 1997. Imagined identities, imagined nationalisms: Print culture and Egyptian nationalism in light of recent scholarship. A review essay. *International journal of Middle East studies* 29, no. 4, (accessed October 12, 2011).

Jankowski, James. February 01, 1999. Print culture, social change, and the process of redifining imagined communities in Egypt; response to the review by Charles D. Smith of "Redifining the Egyptian Nation" (IJMES 29, 4 (1997): 606-22). *International journal of Middle East studies* 31, no. 1, (accessed October 12, 2011).

Smith, Charles D. February 01, 1999. Cultural constructs" and other fantasies: Imagined narratives in "Imagined Communities;" surrejoinder to Gershoni and Jankowski's "Print culture, social change, and the process of redifining imagined communities in Egypt. *International journal of Middle East studies* 31, no. 1, (accessed October 12, 2011).

53Dawisha, p.5

54Dawisha, p.57-59

customs...these are...as manifestations of the spirit of the people or *volksgeist."*[55] According to Fichte, the nation as a metaphysical and transcendental cultural phenomenon cannot be a product of the state, only the nation can create the state.[56] The political situation in Germany, was one of the main reasons that cultural nationalism was a mainly German construct and phenomenon with no unified German state until 1871 in the wake of the Franco-Prussian war.[57]

Another major thinker and developer of German cultural nationalism was Johann Gottlieb Fichte, who defined the nation "eternal" and that it "arises together out of the divine under a certain, special law of divine development," and that this law determines a nation's character.[58] Fichte's contribution was his emphasis of the importance of language to the development of nationalism and the process of "national formation since it is the medium through which national consciousness spreads," and as such it is no surprise that the German cultural nationalists saw language as what kept nations together.[59]

All nationalists agreed that another method for creating a national consciousness was through the writing and dissemination of history, where "tales of heroism, great achievements and unity of purpose of ancestors were resurrected as evidence of the excellence of the nation's 'immemorial past'."[60] Nationalists also used stories of hard work and hardships overcome to depict their nations as strong and virtuous societies, and as such, history becomes an exercise in "myth making," a political tool and as a source of national inspiration, or as Elie Keddourie put it

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55Dawisha, p.57

56Ibid.

57Ibid p.58

58Ibid, p.59

59Ibid, p.60

60Ibid, p.61

to “make use of the past in order to subvert the present.”[61]

Finally, Dawisha explores the importance of education to the creation of nationalism. Fichte's idea of the *Kulturstaat* was a major inspiration to Sati al-'Husri's formulation of his own Arab nationalist ideology and the importance of education. Where the state represented the national culture, and as such schools and curricula would come under state control as way to “mold the individual's identity into that of the state and to make them better and more determined nationalists.” This lead Ernest Gellner to state that for the state, the monopoly on legitimate education is more important than that on the legitimate use of force.[62]

The ideas of the German, romantic and cultural nationalists greatly influenced Sati al-'Husri's thought and most importantly because of his position as a Iraq's Director General of Education allowed him to promote Arab nationalist education in Iraq's schools.[63] These quotes from al-'Husri elucidate his view of how important the teaching of history and language are to the nationalist enterprise:

> We do not exaggerate when we say that generally the movements for resurrection and the struggle for independence and unity begin only by recalling the past and searching for revelation from history...Love for independence is nourished by memories of the lost independence, the longing for power and glory begins with lament for the lost power and glory. If we want to specify the roles of language and history in the formation of a nation, we can say: language is the soul and the life of the nation, history is its memory and its cognizance.[64]

Sati al-'Husri also believed in the teaching of nationalist history, the kind of education

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61Ibid, p.61-62

62Ibid, p.63

63Ibid, p.68

64Ibid p.67-68

that would give students a sense of primordial connection to the Arab nation and as such in a 1922 directive to Iraqi elementary schools al-'Husri stressed that the teaching of history. As it was the key to the "strengthening of patriotic and nationalistic feelings in the heart of students," and for teachers to emphasize the "ideas of the unity of the Arab nation and the Arabism of Iraq."[65]

Progressive Arab Nationalism as Postcolonial Modernization Theory

Bassam Tibi's *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry*[66] lays out many theories of nationalism in the "Third World" expressing the wishes of oppressed peoples for emancipation. But he notes that nationalism "cannot of itself bring about emancipation." Tibi in discussing the work of modernization theorists focused first on their observation that nations, in the Western European sense do not exist in the "Third World." Citing John Kautsky's claim that national borders may form "national states in a legal sense but not nationalities" and in the same vein Sulzbach's formulation of "administrative nationalism" along with Emerson's argument that there were nationalists in the "Third World" but no nations as they were "still in the making"[67]

Secondly, Tibi cites John Kautsky's idea that since nationalism in underdeveloped countries has no history it has to take an anti-colonialist ideology not only opposition of colonialism "narrowly defined, but also to a colonial economic status."[68] Finally, Tibi posits the

65Dawisha, p.68, 73-74

66Tibi, Bassam, Marion Farouk-Sluglett, and Peter Sluglett. *Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry*. New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990. P.13

67 Tibi, p.19

68 Ibid, p.20

idea of the Western educated intellectual as the agent *par excellence* of modernization and of its main manifestation nationalism.[69] According to Tibi, the conflict arises when the Western nationalist modernizing elite comes in conflict with the traditional, indigenous "aristocracy" and bourgeoisie which form an alliance to maintain their interests and thus the old social structure.[70]

The merits of this explanation for the rise of nationalism in the "Third World" has a particularly powerful expression in Arab Nationalism where intellectuals saw that the only manner of advancing the national project was through disentangling the national interests from those of the imperialist client dynasties from Libya to Iraq and beyond outside of the Arab world. This nationalism expressed and rejected what John Kautsky termed "a colonial economic status." British strategic and economic interests had carved out massive concessions from Arab lands and resources, from the Suez Canal, the Iraq Petroleum Company its pipelines, related infrastructure, British military installations, and bases in Egypt, Palestine and Iraq. Arab nationalism in the Progressive form was a reaction against British economic depredation of Arab wealth and its local collaborators and clients

The Development of Egyptian Arab Nationalism in the 1930s and 1940s.[71]

Gershoni and Jankowski approach the issue of Arab nationalism in Egypt as first the culmination of two intellectual movements in Egypt, Islamic nationalism and integral nationalism both of which rejected an "exclusivist territorial nationalism" and put Egypt's place

69 ibid

70 ibid

71 Gershoni and Jankowski, Redefining p.117

within a larger entity.[72] As with Islamic nationalism which centered Egypt's "Arabness" because of its Muslim identity and integral nationalism which saw the Arab world as "the most immediate arena of Egyptian leadership and greatness."[73] But what is the relationship between Arab nationalism in Egypt and that of the Fertile Crescent? To this Jankowski and Gershoni say:

> Egyptian Arab nationalism emerged parallel to, but by no means in isolation from, the ideological doctrines of Pan-Arabism developing in Western Asia at the same time. Although there were certainly theoretical similarities as well as reciprocal influences between Fertile Crescent and Egyptian Arab nationalism, the latter was not simply a branch or subset of the former. Its development cannot be explained simply as the outcome of the diffusion of Pan-Arabist thought into Egypt. It was primarily an Egyptian response to Egyptian stimuli both "objective"- the impact of specific Egyptian conditions of the 1930s and 1940s – and "subjective" – the influence of other nationalist perspectives including Egyptian Islamic nationalism and integral nationalism.[74]

Keeping this in mind the factors which defined the Arab nation for the Egyptian Arab nationalists fell deeply into Sati al-'Husri's conception of cultural nationalism as the main determinant of national identity. Egyptian nationalists saw language as the most important determinant of national identity and as such languages were "determined both the boundaries and the character of national communities," and common languages created unique, distinctive national mentalities and perspectives in short a "national spirit.[75] The importance of language was twofold, "one was that of binding an assemblage of individuals into a cohesive community; the other was that of linking a given generation to its predecessors and its successors."[76] Thus making language into a transcendental vehicle for transmitting national values and myths from

72 See *Redefining* chapters 4 and 5

73 Ibid, p.117

74 Ibid p.117-118

75 Ibid p.118

76 Ibid p.119

one generation to the next; opposed to geographic or racial foundations of nationalism which were natural phenomena and unworthy of explaining a "spiritual phenomenon like national identity."[77] This selection on the creation of the Arab nation shares many aspects with al-'Husri's pan-Arabist thought which placed the Arabic language as the most important factor uniting all Arab peoples, ignoring both geographical and even racial factors in favor of focusing on what Arabs have in common.

Much like al-'Husri, Egyptian Arab nationalists, focused on the common history of the Arab nation as the cliché goes since time immemorial, positing that the separation of Arab history into state based categories was the result of the fragmentation achieved by the imposition of imperial rule upon the Arabs. Egyptian Arab nationalist treated ancient history as a series of:

> Successive waves of migration of a Semitic nucleus (living in the Arabian Peninsula thousands of years ago) through much of the ancient Near East, where they mixed with other linguistic groups to form a single Arabic-speaking population. Already in antiquity, these processes of migration and intermixture had resulted in the creation of a unified Arab national identity.[78]

This made both "unquestionably Semitic" peoples such as the Babylonians, Canaanites, Hebrews, Phoenicians and "dubiously Semitic ones" such as the ancient Egyptians, Sumerians and Hittites into"local variants of the same Arab racial community." Moreover, these "Arab" people had given birth to great civilizations from the Pharaonic to the Carthaginian and more recently, the Classical Islamic civilization and the all of Near Eastern monotheistic religions were "products of the Arab national genius making Moses, Jesus and obviously Mohammed into Arab national figures."[79] Egyptian Arab nationalist thinkers used this paradigm of quasi-historical mythical

77 Ibid pp.119-120

78 Ibid pp.120-121

79 Ibid

formation of the Arab nation as the reason for the quick acceptance of Islam, Arabic language and Arabic customs by the Egyptians after the Expansion of Islam into the Nile valley.[80]

Egyptian Arabists saw Egypt's centrality in the modern history of the Arab world as twofold; they emphasized the political strength of Muhammad Ali's politics both domestically and abroad as a great restorer, uniter and deliverer of the Arab nation from Ottoman oppression through his campaigns in the Sudan, Arabia and the Fertile Crescent. While also emphasizing Egypt's centrality to the project of *nahda* or renewal in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, citing Egyptian thinkers especially Muhammad 'Abduh had played a central role in developing modern Arab thought, Egypt had also served as a refuge for other Arabist thinkers to operate in freedom and "to contribute to *nahda."*[81]

Arab Unity in Egyptian Arab Nationalism

Wahda, unity, "carried many meanings in Egyptian Arab nationalist discourse," it was multifariously comprised of cultural, economic or political dimensions and ranged from "occasional cooperation to institutional integration" but it also surpassed those "practical programmatic specifics" and it was viewed as the natural and crucial prerequisite for success for Arabs in all spheres of life.[82] Moreover, many Egyptian Arabists thought that the only path to *nahda* was through *wahda,* arguing that the only path to restoring the Arab nation to its former glory was through unity. Egyptian Arabists pointed out that the greatest moment in the history of

80 Ibid, p.122

81 ibid

82 Ibid p.133

the Arab nation the, early Islamic period, was one of unification and that division had resulted "in the long era of Arab decline"[83] 'Abd al-Rahman 'Azzam in 1934 asserted,

> The call for an Arab empire is not a dream spawned by a far-reaching imagination, but it is based on historical reality and present necessity. The economic, social and political life of the Arab peoples requires this empire. It is the sole assurance of the independence, freedom and internal as well external peace of these peoples.[84]

'Azzam's above claim stresses how important the political facet of Arab unity was to strengthen the Arab nation against outside depredations, namely Western imperialism. Ibrahim 'Abd al-Qadir Mazini best articulated the need for Arab unity in Egypt securing its future, "an Arab policy was the only policy which Egypt can adopt, embrace and strive for in order to feel confident and assured about its future."[85] Mazini claimed that in the "age of alliances" it was impossible for Egypt or any other Arab country to maintain its security acting "alone…regarding itself as self-sufficient from its neighbors."[86] Egyptian Arabists supported the creation an organization that promoted "institutionalized cooperation among existing Arab countries" in a formal association of Arab regimes in a federalist system, which maintained national sovereignty in their domestic affairs but envisioned cooperation in areas such as "finance, commerce, legal matters and education, the coordination of foreign policy, and the negotiation of inter-Arab defense arrangements"[87]

Egyptian Arabists also claimed that Egypt should play a leading role in the Arab world,

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83 ibid

84 ibid

85 Ibid, p.136

86 Ibid.

87 Ibid, p.137-138

seeing Egypt as being a "big brother" to other Arab regions, especially in the economic and political fields, by merit of having the largest industrial base, the most developed financial sector, and the most international economic connections. Politically, Egypt's "well-developed and relatively liberal political institutions and its burgeoning civil society" contributed[88] to it being "the vanguard of the Arab nations." This hegemonic view of the Arab nation placed Egypt in a position of leadership and supremacy within the Arab nationalist movement.[89]

Ideological and Methodological Concerns:

Nasser's Arab Nationalism as a Counterhegemonic Movement.

Egypt, Iraq and Jordan between 1882 and 1958 were part of Britain's informal empire in the Middle East. Informal imperialism was as dependent on the relationships between classes as on relationships between states. This process manifested itself with the incorporation of the Ottoman Empire and Egypt into the British liberal world order as early as the 1830s. Where the Palmerstonian project, "to regenerate the fallen nations of the world and to uplift those which had never risen" by which "the Sultan…would become [a] convert to the new ideology of progress, would adopt liberal reforms and ...become [a] congenial commercial client and [a] reliable political ally," this became the major thrust of British foreign policy.[90] Egypt became assimilated to the British free trade and investment regime by the 1840s, that came along with private investment in the Egyptian economy, which led to industrial and infrastructural development. By 1873 British investors held more than half of Egyptian government debt and

88 Ibid, p.139-140

89 Ibid , p.140-141

90Hopkins and Cain, British Imperialism, p.341

the proportion increased after Disraeli purchased the Egyptian government's shares in the Suez Canal in the early 1880s.[91] During the Victorian era Egypt and the Ottoman empire were integrated into the British free trading world order which put pressures on states that had at its base a "feudal" form of production. Defined by Adam David Morton as a system where,

> agrarian property was privately controlled by a class of feudal lords who extracted a surplus from the peasants by politico-legal relations of compulsion: 'extra-economic' coercion was articulated through means of labour services, rents in kind, or customary dues owed to the individual lord by the peasant. Feudalism therefore involved a fusion of the juridical serfdom and military protection of the peasantry by a social class of nobles exercising a monopoly of law and private rights of justice within a framework of fragmented sovereignty.[92]

British influence, especially in Iraq and Egypt, only served to strengthen the power of the above "feudal" classes. In Egypt, the Lancashire textile industry's need for cotton led to the consolidation of land ownership into the hands of a few feudal lords for Egyptian agriculture to better serve the needs of the world economy. The same process occurred in Iraq in the latter years of Ottoman control and later during the Hashemite era. In Iraq "land became increasingly the crux of shaikhship. In the river valleys a shaikh without land came to mean in effect a shaikh without a tribe."[93] The effects of British economic expansion into Egypt and Iraq led to the inclusion of those regions into the world economy and effectively served to strengthen the hegemony held by local monarchies and the "feudal" lords. The power of Arab states were based on the power of the "feudal" classes over the state's peasants and the above arrangement

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91Ibid, p.313

92Ibid, p.498

93Batatu, Hanna. 1978. *The old social classes and the revolutionary movements of Iraq: a study of Iraq's old landed and commercial classes and of its Communists, Ba'thists, and Free Officers*. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press. p.110

was one method of British domination in the Arab world.

Another form of British domination in the Arab world was less socioeconomic and more political and military. The British extended influence throughout the Arab world and the Middle East by having had concluded a series of treaties, agreements and concessions that granted Britain transit and base rights in Arab states. The most important these agreements were the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, the status of Jordan's Arab Legion and its leader John Bagot Glubb and the Baghdad Pact. These agreements also served to give Britain a "sphere of influence" in the Arab world and with the particular Arab governments. This constituted imperialism per Hopkins' and Cain's above definition as it violated the sovereignty of each respective Arab state. Both the Hashemites in Iraq and (Trans)Jordan along with the Alawiyya in Egypt were beneficiaries of British backed imperialism and feudalism but their subjects would rise up to oppose their rule.

After World War I, Arab states, focused on nation building as a way to assure legitimacy with their own people and especially in the Hashemite case to make a case for legitimacy for their leadership of states that were created by Anglo-French agreement and with the support of the League of Nations. Education was a major facet of this plan for nation-building in both Egypt and the Hashemite states, the educational system expanded greatly between the end of World War I and the revolutions during the 1950s. These states emphasized Arab nationalism as a key to their curricula, with a pan-Arab and anti-colonialist tone. These schools created literate and well-educated professionals that believed in what they were taught, pan-Arab nationalism. The importance of pan-Arab nationalism along with the opposition to British imperialism and "feudalism" in these Arab states was the context for rebelling against the status quo which is where the thought of Antonio Gramsci and Robert Cox becomes relevant to this study.

Antonio Gramsci in his unfinished article "Some aspects of the southern question" speaking of Southern Italy gave a very close analogy to both the Egyptian and Iraqi case at the time of their revolutions. Gramsci said:

> Southern society is a great agrarian bloc, made up of three social layers: the great amorphous, disintegrated mass of the peasantry; the intellectuals of the petty and medium rural bourgeoisie; and the big landowners and great intellectuals. The Southern peasants are in perpetual ferment, but as a mass they are incapable of giving a centralized expression to their aspirations and needs. The middle layer of intellectuals receives the impulses for its political and ideological activity from the peasant base.[94]

Another analogy that can drawn from Italy's southern question and British imperialism in the Arab world is that "agrarian bloc" was for Gramsci the "intermediary and the overseer of Northern capitalism and the big banks its single aim to preserve the status quo."[95] This made the Mezzogiorno a subaltern region of Italy, much like the Arab world was a subaltern region of the world economy, with the large landowners beholden to the capitalists be it in Turin or in London, they kept the peasants down. In colonial and postcolonial terms hegemony was held by the "feudal" lords, the high level politicians and the monarchies but their power ultimately depended on British capital and on the world economy.

Robert Cox drew many of his concepts of international relations and of power from Antonio Gramsci especially relevant to this case are civil society, transnational social forces, passive revolution and the war of position. Cox taking his cues from Gramsci defined civil society as a "mobilized participant citizenry juxtaposed to dominant economic and state

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94Gramsci, Antonio, and Quintin Hoare. 1978. *Selections from political writings (1921-1926)*. New York: International Publishers. p.454

95Gramsci, p.457

power."[96] The Arab middle classes, the "*effendis,"* created by the process of nation-building after World War I would qualify as a "mobilized and participatory" group. The forces exerted by civil society in this sense were hard to constrain to one state's boundaries and as such, Cox delineates a view of international relations that arises from the interaction of these social forces. Cox outlines his of a political-economy perspective of power:

> The world can be represented as a pattern of interacting social forces in which states play an intermediate though autonomous role between the global structure of social forces and local configurations of social forces within particular countries. This may be a called a political-economy perspective of the world: power is seen as emerging from social processes rather than taken as given in the form of accumulated material capabilities, that is the result of these processes.[97]

A result of this process is the creation of hegemony as "an outward expansion of the internal (national) hegemony by a dominant social class."[98] Egypt as the most advanced country in the Arab world, with the largest civil society, became the vanguard of Arab nationalism under the Wafd. After the revolution, under Abdul Nasser's leadership, Egyptian government policy focused on neutralism, Arab unity, anti-imperialism and social justice. The Egyptian "*effendiyya"* became the hegemonic social class in the most powerful Arab state. And other states in the region namely Jordan and Iraq aimed to follow in Egypt's footsteps. This brings us to the concepts of war of position and passive revolution.

96Cox, Robert W. 1999. "Civil Society at the Turn of the Millenium: Prospects for an Alternative World Order". *Review of International Studies.* 25 (1): 3-28. p.6

97Cox, Robert W., and Timothy J. Sinclair. 1996. *Approaches to world order*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. p.105

98Cox, *Approaches*, p.137. Thus this hegemony becomes a launching point for other countries, "the economic and social institutions, the culture, the technology associated with this national hegemony become patterns for emulation abroad." Further, hegemony can be described as "social structure, an economic structure, and a political structure; and it cannot be simply one of these things but must be all three.

In Cox via Gramsci, the war of position defined as a strategy that non-hegemonic social groups can undertake to make themselves into "a concerted emancipatory bloc within society."[99] Only when the social forces are organized into a group strong enough to challenge the hegemonic social forces that the war of position can succeed.[100] Passive revolution has many meanings in Gramsci's thought, the rise of the "*effendiyya"* and Arab nationalism created a passive revolution in the Arab world. Where the new middle class's war of position had stalled until the various Free Officers groups were able to take control of their respective states from British imperialism and "feudalism"[101] Gramscian and neo-Gramscian analysis lends itself well to studying imperialism, postcolonialism and socioeconomic relations outside of the European context. Italy's "southern question" can easily be transported to the colonial world, along with other concepts such as hegemony, civil society, passive revolution and the war of position. Ultimately, the contradictions inherent in the Arab experience under British informal imperialism, brought an end to monarchy in the Anglo-Arab world.

Egypt's case best demonstrates the issue of the relationship between the British, the monarchy and the landed political elite. Egypt demonstrated the problem of "feudalism" with the incredible amount of concentration of land ownership in order to supply the Manchester textiles industry. At the same time, Egypt had British imperialism thrust upon them with the Suez Canal Zone which was a concessionary arrangement which greatly reduced Egyptian sovereignty. The other issue was the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty which effectively amounted to a British occupation of Egypt. The Wafd and the Free Officers group as nationalist, progressive and anti-

99Cox, *Civil Society, p.16*

100Ibid.

101Ibid.

colonialist political entities were supported by Egyptian "*effendis"* and their time in government reflected these affinities. The Wafd led by Nahas Pasha abrogated the 1936 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty to emphasize Egyptian independence. The major accomplishment of the Free Officers regime was to enact a piece of land reform legislation to break "feudal" power in Egypt's countryside.

Jordan's case was more focused on the problem of British political and military influence in Jordanian affairs. The Arab Legion, General John Glubb and his British officers were ostensibly a Jordanian institution but it ultimately owed allegiance to Whitehall's wishes. In Jordan, domestic social forces, the parties of Jordanian National Movement and the Jordanian Free Officers were opposed to an unfair arrangement. This agreement gave Britain much influence in an Arab state's defense. This coincided with Prime Minister Abdul Nasser's goal to push for an Egyptian foreign policy that opposed imperialism, based on Arab unity, positive neutralism, anti-imperialist nationalism and opposition to the Baghdad Pact. Cairo promoted this policy through the radio and the press and it ultimately succeeded in "Arabizing" the Jordanian army.

Iraq was dependent on the agrarian question and the power relations that girded that Hashemite state. In Iraq the monarchy after 1932 pursued a close relationship with the tribal shaikhs, the largest landowning group in the country. The Iraqi state promoted a policy of concentration of land ownership and based its power in landholding with the elite politicians and the merchants also becoming major landholding classes. Iraq's pan-Arab nationalist middle class, especially the army opposed the monarchy's and the tribal shaikhs legitimacy and their control of major state institutions. The Iraqi middle class throughout the Hashemite period was a group opposed to the socioeconomic status quo. The monarchy, the elite politicians and the merchants

were very important pillars of power for the Iraqi Hashemite state, but another pillar of economic power was the Iraqi Petroleum Company and its royalties. After the revolution, the Free Officers' who were committed to social justice and improving the lives of the Iraqi peasantry a group that had suffered during the monarchy, used the revenues of the Iraqi Petroleum Company to modernize Iraqi agriculture and its social infrastructure (education, sanitation, electricity, health care etc." The major themes of this paper are the power of transnational social forces to transform states societies, which was embraced in the core of the Arab Middle East by a progressive nationalist middle class, and opposed what they thought most harmful to their national well-being British influence – imperialism, feudalism and sociopolitical arrangements – that Arabs saw as undermining Arab sovereignty.

CHAPTER 2: EGYPT 1951-1952: BRITISH IMPERIALISM IN CRISIS.

THE ABROGATION OF THE 1936 ANGLO-EGYPTIAN TREATY, THE JULY 26 COUP AND LAND REFORM

Anglo-Egyptian relations in the immediate aftermath of World War II was dominated by British wishes to renegotiate the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty into a Middle Eastern defense organization centered around defense of the Suez Canal. While Egyptian politicians driven by nationalist public opinion wanted the evacuation of British troops from the Suez Canal Zone. British interests in consolidating a Suez Canal centered defensive arrangement were important, as it would assure British predominance in the Eastern Mediterranean region. The Eastern Mediterranean was key to Britain's economic interests and the maintenance of the liberal order it had established there during the 19th century. Nahas Pasha's Wafdist government abrogated the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty that led to a crisis in the Suez Canal Zone. The Egyptians made the canal's use much more complicated and effectively waged economic war on British shipping and the British personnel in the Suez Canal Zone. The actions taken by both the Egyptian and British governments taken in the course of the 1951-52 crises hurt both countries' economies but Egypt's economy was hurt more.

After the Free Officers took control during the July 26 Revolution, the major measure taken by the new regime was to pass a land reform law that would help Egyptian *fellahin* who had been suffering under the yoke of feudalism during the monarchy. The aim of l and reform was to make the lives of the *fellahin* better and to modernize the methods of agricultural production. The Free Officers, also promoted planned industrial and agricultural development, as a method to improve Egypt's economy that was severely hurt by British imperialism and "feudalism"

Anglo-Egyptian Relations, Defense of the Suez Canal and Economic Concerns.

Running parallel to the economic and financial considerations of British hegemonism in the Middle East was the necessary military and strategic arrangements that were set up in 1882 and 1919, ostensibly as the popular narrative goes, to protect the Suez canal, the Persian Gulf and thus the approaches to the "Jewel of the Empire" India. Several treaties between Great Britain and the relevant Arab nation-states, Egypt and Iraq, secured this in this case.

The Egyptian Government and the British Government signed a treaty in 1936 that gave large military and strategic concessions to the British military in continuing its presence in the Suez Canal Zone. In Article 8 of the treaty, the British were allowed to station 10,000 troops and 400 pilots to secure the Canal as "a universal means of communication as also an essential means of communication between the different parts of the British empire." Until both parties agreed that the Egyptian military had the capacity to secure the canal on its own, twenty years according to the treaty. [102] The Treaty further stipulates that the Egyptian government must build railroads, ports, roads and airfields and to allow for transportation of British military forces at their own cost and the treaty further requires the Egyptian government "will secure the maintenance and constant availability of adequate landing grounds and seaplane anchorages in Egyptian territories and waters."[103] Further, as is expected of any foreign power in a quasi-occupation of a foreign country, the 1936 also arranged to give "immunities and privileges" to British forces in Egypt,

102Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of Alliance and Friendship Volume 173 League of .Nations Treaty Series 401 (1936-1937)

103Ibid

modeled on the Ottoman era and style capitulations.[104] It gave immunity to the British forces in Egypt from being prosecuted in Egyptian courts of either criminal or civil law "in any matter arising out of his official duties."[105]

Arrangemenst like the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty where two parties were so disparate in power, prestige and position, in this case Egypt and Great Britain can be nothing more than a case of informal imperialism. British military forces in Egypt were accorded much immunity because of the 1936 treaty and as such had much latitude in performing their duties while in Egypt. This would soon become a problem as this gave an appearance of a foreign occupation as members of the British military could not be prosecuted by the Egyptian government for crimes against Egyptian citizens. These arrangements allowed Britain to implement its strategic imperatives by taking advantage of the other states strategic position and relative weakness and the necessary connections to the British in other areas such as finance or commerce. It is outside of the scope of this paper to discuss Egypt's involvement in the Second World War along with the strategic importance of the Suez canal and of a compliant Egyptian government in Cairo played in the British war effort in the Mediterranean. To say the least the defense of Egypt and the Canal Zone was a major concern for British war planners

In 1945, Britain's Labour government led by Prime Minister Clement Attlee and Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin sought to renegotiate the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty of 1936 on a basis of a "footing of full and free partnership as between equals in defense of their mutual interests and with full respect for the independence and sovereignty of Egypt."[106] Labour sought to reconcile

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104Ibid.

105Ibid.

106Hahn, Peter L. 1991. *The United States, Great Britain, and Egypt, 1945-1956: strategy and diplomacy in the early Cold War*. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. Pp.29-30

this idea of giving Egypt and other Arab states their independence and sovereignty with its own strategic and economic imperatives by undertaking a plan which was defined by a policy of economic and social reform that would create "a commonwealth of partnerships" and to enlist them in regional defense plans.[107] This view of creating a defense organization with Egypt and the Canal Zone as its keystone, was a policy that was in continuity with Churchill's last government; that saw the defense of the Middle East as a "matter of life and death to the British Empire"[108]

By 1946, Bevin and the Foreign Office also sought to protect Britain's own economic interests in the Mediterranean region by assuring for the defense of Egypt. One way it did so was to maintain British military presence there. Removing British military assets from the Eastern Mediterranean Bevin claimed would allow Russia to move in to the Mediterranean and would result therein the end of "commerce and trade, economy and democracy."[109] Particularly the gentlemanly and liberal economic order that British private and government interests had been cultivating in the Eastern Mediterranean since the 1830s, based on free trade and financial imperialism. They sought to strengthen these relationships and partnerships by using the force of renegotiating the 1936 Treaty under a new form, which still conceded to Egyptian interests for national self-determination, and sovereignty, which was not the case under the current Anglo-Egyptian agreement. Bevin aimed to do this by creating a joint Anglo-Egyptian defense arrangement, with the following conditions:

As a minimum, Britain demands the right to maintain its base facilities in Egypt in

107Hahn, Strategy and Diplomacy p.30

108Ibid.

109Ibid.

> peacetime and to use them in the event of war or international emergency. Britain would withdraw all combat troops from Egypt, provided it could continue to station maintenance technicians and air defense in the Canal Zone[110]

Bevin asked the United States to help, stating Britain's case for negotiating the defense arrangements surrounding the Canal Zone, which Secretary of State James Byrne did by sending a communiqué to King Farouk in the end of May. The communique explicitly made the case that the British proposal would ensure Egypt's and the other Arab states full sovereignty and independence while avoiding "running the risk of undermining the security of the Middle East" and "to defend the Middle East from outside aggression." This ultimately backfired as the Egyptians did not take kindly to American "intervention" in Egyptian affairs and led to Egyptian Prime Minister Sidky Pasha's demand that Egypt would only consider entering with Western defense plans if Britain unconditionally withdrew its troops from Egypt.[111]

This was followed by a long stalemate in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations surrounding Britain's reasonable reluctance to unilaterally remove all of its troops from Egypt. Which was expressed by both the Foreign Office and the British military, with Scrivener at the Egypt desk in the Foreign Office saying that "Egyptian demands 'utterly failed to meet realities' of postwar international relations." While the British Chief of Staff (COS), wanted the Egyptian government in exchange for withdrawal to give "an effective guarantee that the Egyptian will develop and maintain necessary naval, military and air bases… and make these available to us as soon as His Majesty's Government consider that a state of emergency has arisen.[112]" In October of 1946, Sidky traveled to London in order to hold meetings with Bevin in person, they would

110Hahn, p.31

111Hahn, p.32

112Ibid, p.33

come to a consensus on British evacuation and for the provision of a joint defense board; Sidky and Bevin agreed that British troops would evacuate Cairo and Alexandria by 31 March 1947 and all of Egypt by 1 September 1949.[113] Along with the agreement to undertake the joint defense board, Sidky assured Bevin that "Egypt would take appropriate measures should territory contiguous to Egypt be invaded," the agreement was derailed by the issue of the Sudan, with the British and Egyptian having widely diverging views of Sudan's future.[114]

> Sidky demanded Egyptian-Sudanese political union, and Bevin insisted on Sudanese self-determination. To resolve the conflict, they approved a vague compromise, pledging to recognize "the framework of unity between the Sudan and Egypt under the common crown of Egypt: but declaring their "essential objective" to be Sudanese well-being, independence, and self-government.[115]

According to Hahn, this "brought Britain and Egypt closer to the peaceful settlement of their differences than they would be in the next decade but the treaty collapsed because of differing interpretations of the Sudan protocol." This led to rioting in Khartoum precipitated by Sidky's declaration of Egyptian-Sudanese unity in late October; Attlee invited members of the pro-independence Umma party to 10 Downing street and on 7 December Sir Hubert Huddleston, the British Governor-General in the Sudan "announced an initiative to prepare the Sudanese for self-rule," which led to Sidky resigning his post two days later. [116] The Labour government still sought to ratify the Sidky-Bevin treaty with Sidky's replacement Nokrashy, but nationalism did not allow for Nokrashy to give further concessions and Britain wouldn't concede on Sudanese

113Ibid, p.34

114Ibid.

115Ibid

116Ibid.

self-determination.[117] The Egyptians wanted to assert their national right to self-determination and sovereignty, but both Sidky and Nokrashy were the leaders of minority parties that were at odds with the Wafd, which forced their hand and made them inflexible when it came to defense issues, as they had to be more nationalistic than the Wafd.[118] The issue of nationalism in Egypt's dealing with the British in defense negotiations had been exposed in Sidky's wish for the union of Egypt and the Sudan and for the complete evacuation of all British troops from Egypt. But, the issue of Egyptian nationalism would become even more pertinent with the election of the Wafd and the Return of Nahas Pasha as prime minister.

In January of 1950, Nahas Pasha and the Wafd came back to power in an "overwhelming victory," which leads naturally to a discussion of the Wafd during the 1950s, as a treatment of its origins since 1919 would take too much space and is ultimately unrelated to the overarching theme of this paper. A memo from Foggy Bottom to the American Embassy in London in December of 1951 gives an analysis of the popularity of the Wafd in Egyptian politics. The State department felt that Egyptian nationalism was a "deeply rooted movement" and that it "substantially accurate expression of popular feeling against UK."[119] The State Department also said that contrary to the British they saw that as time passed and there were more incidents and deaths of Egyptian civilians the Wafd may not be replaced by more "reasonable politicians" but it may be replaced by "extremist elements." That could incite "chaos and anarchy" and force

117Ibid.

118Louis, William Roger. 1984. The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945-1951: Arab nationalism, the United States, and postwar imperialism. Oxford: Clarendon Press.

119Foreign Relations of the United States The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, December 14, 1951, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, Volume V, P.438

Britain to reoccupy Egypt and fuel the flames of Egyptian nationalism.[120] Jefferson Caffery in 1952, the American Ambassador in Egypt gave another view of the strengths of the Wafd's political power compared to both minority parties the Saadists and the Liberal Constitutionalists. Caffery mentioned the Wafd's strong organization and the pitfalls facing Hilali Pasha's cabinet in trying to govern without the support of the Wafd and its supporters, namely public employees, students, the *fellahin* (peasants) and the young army officers. The Wafd as the main nationalist and anti-Monarchy party in Egypt it has the political position of trying to move people against any government by portraying it as "Palace and/or Brit[ish] stooge."[121]

In his memoirs Sir Laurence Grafftey-Smith wrote this of the political situation in Egypt:

> He observed that in the 1950-2 period Egyptian politics were still dominated by the Turko-Egyptian palace elite, the landlord class and the upper levels of the army and bureaucracy. What of the effendis - 'the brash young…mouthing political slogans, preaching change, menacing a paternalistic establishment?' What of the 'students, junior officials and the others easily written off as 'half baked?' Above all what of the young army officers "who found those pot-bellied and diabetic generals and time-serving politicians unacceptable?'[122]

This meant that the Wafd had to make its own "pasha government" more anti-British than the young nationalistic *effendiyya* that so opposed the British presence and the corruption of the sociopolitical elite.[123]

It is in this context, that the Wafd government under the leadership of Nahas Pasha abrogated the 1936 treaty that would ultimately bring to end an era in Anglo-Egyptian relations.

120Ibid.

121Foreign Relations of the United States, Caffery to the Department of State, 8 March 1952, FRUS, IX, 1952, p.1774-1775.

122Louis, 699-700

123Ibid.

and through a recurring theme of bad decisions and military intervention cause the fall of the monarchy and the rise of the Free Officers regime. The case can be made that the history of Anglo-Egyptian and Arab foreign policy evolved and developed through crises and the abrogation of the Anglo-Egyptian treaty of 1936 in October of 1951 was the one such crisis. That would set off a series of events that would culminate in the end of British hegemony in the Middle East and a much larger role for Egypt on regional issues, with Egypt attempting to replace Britain's hegemony.

On October 8 1951, Nahas Pasha introduced a bill in the Egyptian parliament that would abrogate the 1936 treaty and the 1899 condominium agreement, he then went on to list the reasons why the Anglo-Egyptian treaty was no longer binding.

> (A) it was signed under duress during British occupation.
> (He quoted Mr. Bevin and the United Nations Security Council
> on the Russian/Persian dispute of 1916).
> (B) it was inconsistent with the United Nations Charter.
> (C) It was inconsistent with the Suez Canal Convention.
> (D) Great Britain had broken the Treaty in various ways,
> e.g. (1) The provisions regulating the number of forces
> (2) breaches of Customs and Health regulations etc.
> (3) her attitude during the Palestine war was
> inconsistent with her duties as Ally under the Treaty [124]

To close the speech Nahas said "For the sake of Egypt I signed the 1936 Treaty and for the sake of Egypt I call on you today to abrogate it" when according to Caffery's communication

124Foreign Office, Foreign Office Stevenson to Foreign Office, Cairo 8th October, 1951, FO 371/90140

to Washington "bedlam broke out in the Parliament. Representatives of each of the Opposition parties called for and received the floor to shout wholehearted support of the Government's actions.[125] In response to this King Farouk had told Ralph Stevenson the British ambassador in Egypt that he had only signed the bill calling for abrogation of the 1936 treaty "very much against his will." King Farouk also said he did not know why the Egyptian government would make such a move except that he thought "it strengthened the Government's position for the moment." Farouk also told Stevenson that the Wafd had come to power in the winter of 1949-50 "against his will," the King expressed "fear that as a result of the Abrogation of the Treaty some direct action might be taken by the Egyptian Government against our [British] troops in the Canal zone such as interference with their supplies."[126] The conflict between the King and the Wafd was one of the major problems in Anglo-Egyptian relations and Egyptian politics. While the Wafd and Nahas Pasha were first of all trying to assert their nationalist belief in trying to pursue policies such as the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty or just to be oppositional to the Palace's and Great Britain's goals in their Egyptian defense and economic policies. Farouk and the Palace elite almost always agreed with British policy instead of the Wafd's stances Farouk had no nationalist sentiments and didn't see how he would benefit from a successful Wafd party as he saw it Britain's interests in Egypt and the Canal Zone more closely aligned with his than that of the Wafd or the Egyptian people. And especially among the ever important and growing *effendiyya,* which was of so much importance in Egyptian nationalist politics.

125FRUS, Caffery to the Department of State, C October 9, 1951, FRUS, 1951, V 392

126Foreign Office, Stevenson to Foreign Office, Cairo 9th October 1952, FO 371/90140

Economic and Financial Effects of the Abrogation of the 1936 Treaty and the 1951-52 Suez Crisis.

A letter written in the Foreign Office, titled "Possible Consequences of an Anglo-Egyptian Deadlock" the issue of economic and financial actions that the Egyptian government might take in denying the British the use of the Suez Canal. Countermeasures such as depriving the Canal Zone of Egyptian workers and certain kinds of financial "warfare" that the Egyptian government could use to compel the British to do what they wanted.

The first thing that the Egyptian government could do would be to deny the British forces in the Canal Zone the "labour force of some 50,00 which are now employed there" and to deny the port facilities needed to ships carrying supplies for British forces in the Canal Zone.[127] "Deadlock" also cites four ways by which the Egyptian government could stop navigation through the canal,

1. denying port facilities to British ships passing through the Canal;
2. denying port facilities to ships of other countries destined to go to Britain through the canal;
3. by "administrative obstruction "for example, perverse interpretation of customs regulations or refusal to allow Suez Canal pilots on board" to ships in category one;
4. do the same thing to ships in category two[128.]

The author of "Deadlock" thought that measures one and two would "cause incovenience to shipping" while three and four "would be of utmost gravity, particularly as regards the United

127Foreign Office, Memorandum, Possible Consequences of an Anglo-Egyptian Deadlock, 24th January 1951, FO 371/90129

128Ibid.

Kingdom's oil supplies."[129] In response to this the British government could either not allow the Egyptian government the use of the pipeline from Cairo to Agrud. Alternetively if the Egyptian government would use either measure 3 or 4, the British government could invoke the Suez Canal Convention and refer the situation to the Security Council to "justify the use of force to ensure the free passage of our shipping through the Canal"[130]

"Deadlock" also accounts for the financial consequences of a hostile Egyptian government opposed to the transit of British ships through the Canal

a) to require us to pay Suez Canal dues in gold or dollars, at cost of £7 million a year;

b) to require us to pay our military expenditure in Egypt in dollars at £14 million a year;

c) "to require us to pay in dollars for all Egyptian exports to the sterling area;

d) it is also conceivable that the Egyptian Government might, for a limited period, attempted to stop selling cotton to the United Kingdom,"[131]

"Deadlock" cites that in response to (d) the Egyptian government would no longer be able to sell all of its cotton at current world prices. Even though they could conceive of Russia buying Egyptian cotton "in order to bolster up the Egyptians;" while the lack of Egyptian cotton would cause serious but not irreparable consequences in Lancashire, as of the beginning of 1951 Britain had enough cotton supplies to last only nine months.[132]

129Ibid.

130Ibid.

131Ibid.

132Ibid.

If the Egyptian Government went ahead and implemented the measures in (b) and (c), which only affected the United Kingdom, the first move would be to remove Egypt from the Transferable Account Area. Which would prevent it from trading in sterling with other countries "without express permission from the Bank of England in each individual case; and secondly, to dollar-invoice the Egyptians, a step that would involve blocking Egypt's free sterling balances, which at present amount to roughly £50 million.[133]

Accepting the idea of the "official mind of imperialism" as posited by Gallagher and Robinson in the historiographical sketch above, it is important to keep in mind that Whitehall, the Foreign Office and the British Embassy in Egypt were aware of the options that were outlined in the above policy sketch ."Deadlock," was in the currents of information and policy were always open and as such there always an expected outcome that any Egyptian action that would interdict British economic and financial activity in the Canal and the Zone and is an interesting point to expand on here.

On the 24th of October, the Director General of the Suez Canal Company had been instructed to not allow British shipping to use the Suez Canal, further instructions were given at Port Said to deny British ships oil and water. Interestingly the following part was underlined by somebody at the Foreign office so somebody must have thought it important: "situation is deteriorating in so far as Egyptian cooperation is concerned. British Military government of Canal Zone may have to be given serious consideration if further deterioration occurs."[134]

The following day the Egyptian cabinet met and it came to several conclusions about

133Ibid.

134Foreign Office Stevenson to Foreign Office, Cairo 24th October 1951, FO 371/90143

what measures it should take vis-a-vis non-cooperation with the British concerns in the Canal Zone. Director of General Customs Administration, gave orders that customs authorities "were not to cooperate in clearing ships in accordance with the compromise agreement to which they had previously agreed." [135] The cabinet has also given out a general order to intensify non-cooperation and that labor offices had been set up outside of the Canal Zone to move labor away from the British army.[136] In reaction to these actions by the Egyptian government, the plan to force the situation by the embargo of oil to Cairo and the Delta went as planned, which led the Wafd government to already start pleading to the British to stop the oil embargo. Abboud Pasha, came to see Ralph Stevenson "as an emissary of the Prime Minister and the Minister of the Interior," telling Stevenson that the bakeries of the Cairo and other large Egyptian towns depended on it. Stevenson replied that there could not be a postponement unless the Egyptian state railways could provide the necessary rolling stock.[137]

Ultimately the plans that were elaborated in "Deadlock" above never escalated to the level of the financial and economic warfare that the author was dreading would happen, but many of the other forms of Egyptian non-cooperation in trying to cut off the Suez Canal to the British came to be. In response the British embargoed oil to the Egyptian population in Cairo and the Delta, which according to Stevenson caused "loud cries of anguish" from the Egyptian government that he hoped will teach them "a much-needed lesson."[138]

The British Embassy in Egypt, gave a detailed account of the economic effects of

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135Foreign Office Stevenson to Foreign Office, Cairo 25th October, 1951, FO 371/90143.

136Ibid.

137Foreign Office Stevenson to Foreign Office, Cairo 25th October , 1951, no.836 FO 371/90143

138Foreign Office, Stevenson to Foreign Office , Cairo 23rd October , 1951, FO 371/90143

abrogation of the treaty along with British economic and military intervention. Was written in July of 1952, but still serves to illustrate my point about how closely linked the British and Egyptian economies were that in the period from October of 1951 to July of 1952 there could have been such a major change in the Egyptian economy for the worse.

The British Embassy in Egypt outlines the economic situation in Egypt relating to the assumption of power by the Wafd government and the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty both of which had negative consequences to Egypt's economy along with the rise of cotton prices. Cresswell at the embassy mentions that since October of 1951 "the inflated price of cotton" along with declining customs receipts have led to a £40 million deficit and the Egyptian government currently holds between two and half and three million qantars of cotton which was valued at £14 million instead of the usual £32 million.[139]

The national bank of Egypt only had £4 million on hand, as a result of this, the Egyptian government had to restrict imports from countries in the Sterling area representing £70 million of imports in 1951. The above factors along with the lack of a clear cut economic policy "created considerable uneasiness throughout the country," with merchants having to reduce their orders abroad this caused both private and public development projects such as "the electrification of the Aswan dam, the fertilize factory at Aswan, the electrification of the Helwan railway and so forth" to be delayed.[140] Cresswell concludes by saying that because of the economic situation in Egypt "British interests will inevitably suffer," as the transfer of capital, profits and Egyptian exports and Egyptian orders for British products has been highly restricted.

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139 Foreign Office, Cresswell to Foreign Office, Cairo 12 July 1952. FO 371/96877

140 Ibid.

The Egyptian economy at this point was highly dependent on the sale of cotton for the majority of its income. During the Suez crisis of 1951-52, the bottom fell out of the cotton market as Britain stopped buying its considerable share of the Egyptian cotton crop which was of key importance to both the mills in Lancashire and the Egyptian producers.

I think the above discussion of Anglo-Egyptian relations in the post war era works very well to illustrate three major points that are key to understanding the relationship between the Egyptian and British government on both a strategic and on economic basis. First, both of these strands linkedt Egypt into the British Empire and that Britain depended on its hegemony and the local Egyptian elite to maintain it in the Suez Canal Zone. Bevin and Whitehall believed that British presence in Egypt and the Canal Zone was key to protecting "commerce and trade, economy and democracy," in the Mediterranean area. This can be interpreted as the British government's wish to maintain the familiar liberal order of free trade and democracy that it had created during the 19th century. Attlee and Bevin, the leaders of the Labour party could be said to supporting a vaguely Liberal position in the Gladstonian form preferring intervention in keeping liberal institutions and regimes in place.

Secondly, Egyptian nationalism was enough of a political force for both Wafdist and non-Wafdist politicians that it came to play a major role in Anglo-Egyptian negotiations surrounding the 1936 Treaty and its revision as an imperative for British defense of the Middle East. Sidky Pasha in 1946 had been able to agree with Bevin on the evacuation of British military forces from Egyptian cities and then the Canal Zone. Ultimately, the issue of the Sudan scuttled the entire issue and forced Sidky Pasha's resignation. Nationalist politics had definitely played a major role in the events surrounding the Bevin-Sidky negotiations of 1946. This was even more marked in the Wafd's negotiations in 1951 that ultimately led to the abrogation of the 1936

Treaty. The Wafd as the main nationalist party in Egypt had a political base in the growing and ever important "*effendiyya",* which was radically opposed to British imperialism in Egypt. This ultimately led to the Wafd taking a very hard line on defense issues and ultimately Abrogation turned out to be a massively popular political move as shown above.

Third, the power of Egyptian non-cooperation in matters concerning the navigation, maintenance and convenience of the Canal and the British bases in the zone, became a point of Egyptian success the 1951-52 Suez Crisis, but that must be qualified. Because of the tight connections between the British and Egyptian economies, economic warfare would hurt both countries but it would always hurt Egypt more. Egyptian non-cooperation and obstructionism in the everyday running and administration of the Suez canal proved to be a large problem for the British economy, especially as it so depended on the oil in the tankers bound from the Persian Gulf to Haifa's refineries that could finally be shipped to Britain. Being able to control the Suez Canal and the ability to disrupt it was a major weapon available to the Egyptian government. But as reported by the British Embassy Egypt's victory was a Pyrrhic one. In the course of 1951-52 Egypt was not able to sell its cotton quota to Britain, its major export to its major consumer, which greatly hurt Egypt's economy. Secondly, Egypt's sterling balances would diminish and it would have to impose import controls on products coming from the sterling area. Egypt's dependency on Britain as its major trading partner was a major problem in trying to effectively fight an economic *guerrilla war,* which ultimately hurt its own people than the British.

The above discussion of British economic and strategic interests set against Egyptian wishes for political and national sovereignty and the projection of this wish in Abdul Nasser's vision of Egypt's foreign policy; ultimately outline the entire discussion for the rest of this chapter in particular and this paper in general. The British government saw Egypt and the Suez

Canal Zone as imperative to the defense of the empire. British politicians and war planners saw the Soviet Union as a threat to stability in the Middle East and the Mediterranean and wished to maintain a presence in Egypt that would allow them to adequately fight the Soviets in case of war, thus the concern with the use of Egyptian military installations in case of an emergency. But the connection between the Egyptian and British economies is an even more interesting topic as the 1951-52 Suez Crisis showed, Egypt could be hurt substantially by not being able to export its cotton to Britain. However, British commerce and finance was also highly dependent on Egypt as it couldn't maintain its export of base if Egypt was not "online" and trading raw cotton for finished goods and other key commodities.

The July 23 Revolution, The Free Officers and Land Reform

The 1951-52 Suez Crisis showed something important about Egypt's socioeconomic and political make up, that at that stage the King, the Palace and the major landowners were still largely in control of the levers of political and economic power. The Wafd was an oppositional voice in matters, with its nationalistic and anti-British stances, that manifested itself in the abrogation of the 1936 Treaty. But the largest and the most important classes in Egypt had no representation in the government, the *fellahin* in the countryside and the *effendiyya* in the cities. The aim of this chapter is not to bog myself down with the narrative history of the coup d'etat, but to sketch the ideological model of the Free Officers and their aims in doing what they did. What Gamal Abdul Nasser and the other Free Officers had in mind was Egypt's modernization, but again that must be qualified in order to avoid essentialization.

Rashid al-Barrawi was the major thinker that would ultimately influence Abdul Nasser

and the Free Officers in their program of modernizing the Egyptian economy. Modernization is a theory that is "progressive" in the sense that it presupposes that history moves linearly forward, meaning that for something to modernized it first has to be "backward." al-Barrawi defined backwardness in his analysis as the major causes of the Russian revolution. Al-Barrawi also stressed the deleterious effects of the ruling class and its wish "to keep a reserve of cheap labor and preserve a situation of semi-slavery, thereby blocking the advancement of the agrarian productive forces and thwarting the application of advanced methods."[141] Secondly, al-Barrawi posits the power of Western capital investments "aggravated the retardation of the development of the socioeconomic structure," which he says failed to create development as its main drive was to export profits which left the workers more impoverished. [142] More specifically relating to the Egyptian case al-Barrawi wrote with Muhammad Hamza Ulaysh, a book which was published in 1944, called the *The Economic Development if Egypt in the Modern Era,* which ask sthe question of why "poverty, disease and ignorance were still prevalent in Egypt." In which the authors write that over-dependence on the export of cotton under British control meant that Egypt was not able to industrialize during the 19th century. The authors claimed was a "deliberate policy of the British, who prevented Egypt from developing economically through the use of tariffs, and other political and economic instruments," which al-Barrawi and Ulaysh said left Egypt dependent on the export of cotton and foreign investment.[143]

Rashid al-Barrawi's policy prescription for fixing the above problems was of poverty, ignorance and disease was to handle land reform. In 1945, al-Barrawi and Ulaysh wrote a new

141 Meijer, Roel. 2002. *The quest for modernity: secular liberal and left-wing political thought in Egypt, 1945-1958*. London: RoutledgeCurzon. p.78

142Ibid.

143Ibid, p.81

chapter to the above work *Economic Development in Egypt* in which they reference a statistic that one eighth of one percent of the landowners owned half of the land in Egypt.[144] In order to deal with this inequality al-Barrawi planed to expropriate the land of any owner that held more than 50 *feddan* and to redistribute the land to three-quarter of a million of the poorest *fellahin* "especially those farmers with less than two *feddan."*[145] But was al-Barrawi's impulse in this plan to redistribute Egypt's land to the poorest farmers in society? According to Meijer, al-Barrawi was highly influenced by the Sidney and Beatrice Webb and the thought of the British Fabian Society, which emphasized the ideal of modernization, efficiency, economies of scale. This would be accomplished by the collectivization of small five *feddan* plots into 1000 *feddan* farms, which would allow for the use of the most advanced technology and to provide, housing, education and healthcare to Egypt's *fellahin*.[146] Finally, al-Barrawi stresses the point that he saw the *effendiyya* as the most important class to realizing Egypt's revolution as the "most revolutionary" as they were "inimical to British imperialism, Palace absolutist pretensions, feudal and capitalist privileges."[147]

Rashid al-Barrawi's non-capitalist vision for the potentiality for modernization and his analysis of the socioeconomic power relations in Egypt assume cultural hegemony in the Coxian and Gramscian sense. Al-Barrawi said that the palace, the capitalists and the "feudal" lords in the countryside held all the real power and that they were exploiting the *fellahin* for their own and British profit interests. Socialist conceptions of history are teleological meaning that there

144Ibid. p.83

145Ibid, p.84

146Ibid.

147Meijer, p.88

must be an end point and al-Barrawi wrote that he saw the *effendiyya* along with the *fellahin* as the two classes in Egypt that could work together to move Egypt into the next step of historical development. It seems as though Abdul Nasser and his fellow Free Officers in the Revolutionary Command Committee saw the prospects for Egyptian history in much the same way.

The Free Officers' coup d'etat on 23 July 1952, was done according to their leader at the time General Mohammed Neguib in order to get rid of the "thieves and traitors" that had done so much damage to Egypt's military and to make positive changes "for the interests of the nation in the light of the constitution."[148] The Free Officer's anti-corruption message, arose from Egypt's and the Arab defeat in Palestine where they greatly outnumbered the Israelis but the Arab forces would still ultimately lost. But, what was more significant in the Free Officer's move was the stressing of the modernizing influences that their revolution carried. Abdul Nasser's so-called "six principles" of the revolution are a very good expression of Abdul Nasser's and the Free Officers' goals of modernizing Egypt on their own terms and as a rejection of the imperialism and "feudalism" and the classes that benefited from it. The "six principles" as such are these:

> "the eradication of all aspects of imperialism; the extinction of feudalism; the eradication of monopolies, and the control of capitalistic influence over the system of government; the establishment of strong national army; the establishment of social justice; and the establishment of a sound democratic society" [149]

It is obvious that references to "imperialism" and "monopolies" relate to the British presence in the Canal Zone and the ownership of the Suez Canal itself, but this a discussion for another paper. I want to shift my focus to two other of the principles the "extinction of feudalism"

148Foreign Relations of the United States, Memorandum by Alta F. Fowler, July 28, 1952. FRUS 1952-1954 Vol IX.

149Hanna, Sami A., and George H. Gardner. 1969. *Arab socialism. [al-Ishtirakīyah al-'Arabīyah] (romanized form) A documentary survey*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press. p.103

and "establishment of social justice" which are references to Egypt's agrarian situation and the plight of its impoverished *fellahin* and to support development and industrialization.

Rashid al-Barrawi was called upon by Abdul Nasser and the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) to draft a piece of legislation that would take care of land reform and would "liberate the bulk of the peasants from the feudalism which was corollary of the system of land tenure."[150] On August 12, 1952 in al-Misri the Wafdist newspapers published a version of al-Barrawi's land reform bill setting the ceiling at 200 *feddan* of land.[151] Abdul Nasser elaborated on the Agrarian Reform law in his Foreign Affairs article, besides setting a ceiling on land ownership it "provided against the breaking up of holdings not exceeding five acres. It also regulated the relation between landlord and tenant, by legalizing certain tenant rights." [152] In a related matter Khaled Mohieddin in his memoir also says that the Revolutionary Command Council confiscated the King's and the dynasty's property to use in building of schools and healthcare providers in the countryside.[153]

In October of 1952, the RCC set up the Permanent Council for the Development of National Production (PCDNP) led by Husayn Fahmi an Egyptian businessman. General Naguib said of the PCDNP that it would help to organize Egypt's production in a "national and scientific basis." Egypt's road to industrialization and modernization would be built upon exploiting the power of the Nile river by the building of the Aswan High Dam which Abdul

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150Nasser, Gamal Abdel. January 01, 1955. The Egyptian Revolution. *Foreign affairs (New York, N.Y.)* 33, no. 2, (accessed November 17, 2011). p.204; Muḥyī al-Dīn, Khālid. 1995. *Memories of a revolution: Egypt, 1952*. Cairo, Egypt: American University in Cairo Press. p.122

151Meijer. p.149

152Nasser, The Egyptian Revolution p.204

153Muḥyī al-Dīn, Memories of a Revolution, p.131

Nasser claimed would "increase agricultural output by almost 50 percent," reclaim two million acres of land and make more than one million other acres more productive. Along with helping agricultural development, the Aswan High Dam helped with industrial development by providing Egypt's industries with ten billion kilowatt-hours of electricity *per annum*. The Aswan Dam Abdul Nasser mentioned the building of a fertilizer plant at Aswan and of a steel works at Helwan.[154] Abdul Nasser also advocated for the implementation of import substitution industrialization with policies such as the imposition of protective tariffs, new policies to attract foreign capital and the improvement of the local infrastructure and industrial capacity.[155] Abdul Nasser concluded by saying this about the nature of the Free Officers' revolution. Its aim was

> To end the Exploitation of people, to realize national aspirations and to develop the mature political consciousness that is an indispensable preliminary for a sound democracy. The revolution seeks to bridge the gulf between social classes and to foster the spirit of altruism which marks a cultivated individual and a cohesive group. Our ultimate aim is to provide Egypt with a truly democratic and representative government, not the type of parliamentary dictatorship which the Palace and a corrupt "pasha" class imposed on the people. [156]

The influences of modernization theories and policies for the actions of the RCC are a prism for scholars to view their policies and their goals when dealing in the foreign arena. Modernization closes the triangle that was opened in the historiography above. With the first leg being imperialism and its effects on Arab societies and secondly Arab nationalism and more importantly an impulse torwards Arab unity which Abdul Nasser held. Modernization and Arab Unity was the only way of displacing the old social classes, the monarchs and "pashas" and to set up truly independent Arab states.

154Nasser, p.205-207

155Ibid.

156Nasser, p.208.

Conclusion

The sociopolitical realities of Egypt in the later stages of the monarchy was one of concentration be it of power, land, resources or influence. The king and the "pashas" controlled the levers of political power and used their positions for their own gain. The British controlled Egypt by the way of military occupation in the Suez Canal Zone and elsewhere in the major cities. The landowners who served imperial interests by feeding the Manchester textile mills controlled the majority of Egypt's land. The other two classes the "*effendis"* and the "*fellahin"* who were the most numerous controlled nothing and were subservient to the imperialists and the "feudal" lords.

Under the leadership of the Wafd and in the army, Egypt's "*effendis"* organized themselves into a class that was conscious of itself and opposed to the status quo. The new middle class, created by the growth of public education, print media and the nationalist thought, after World War II matured and opposed the monarchy, the British and "feudalism." The opposition to renegotiating the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, its abrogation and the Coup d'etat of July 23 were a result of the Egypt's middle classes finally concluding a long period of passive revolution and of war of position.

Ultimately, Gamal Abdul Nasser and the Free Officer regime was able to achieve the goals of Egypt's "*effendi"* civil society, namely to alleviate the situation in the countryside with the promulgation of land reform legislation. Land reform would break the power of the "feudal" lords and promote social justice, and make modernization of the Egyptian economy possible. Second in 1954, Egypt finally concluded an agreement with Britain for the evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone, ending a British military occupation of Egypt for the first time since 1882.

The Wald's and the Free Officer's successes in ridding Egypt from imperialism and "feudalism" would become a pattern that other Arab countries emulated in the following years. This made progressive Arab nationalism the ideology that defined Arab politics during the 1950s.

CHAPTER 3: THE COLD WAR IN THE ARAB WORLD: EGYPTIAN FOREIGN POLICY, THE BAGHDAD PACT, NEUTRALISM AND ARAB RIVALRY

It is important to note that the nature of this inquiry is inherently of a dual nature. Egyptian foreign policy manifested itself through the contracting of multilateral treaties aimed at balancing against British and Americans plans for defense of the Middle East against Soviet encroachment. John Foster Dulles' "northern tier" concept, which aimed to join the Middle Eastern states on the Soviet Union's southern border in a defensive scheme against the Soviet threat. This facet of Western defense policy was driven by the need to replace Egypt as the core to any defensive arrangement in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean as the abrogation of the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty by Nahas Pasha's Wafdist government. Furthermore, there were continuing discussions surrounding the evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone between Britain and the Revolutionary Command Council mentioned in the end of the previous chapter.

The impetus behind Dulles' "northern tier" concept was to contain Soviet designs on the Middle East proper; much like Greece and Turkey's accession to NATO was championed by Dean Acheson to stop Soviet expansion into the eastern Mediterranean . Although the United States originated the "northern tier" concept it is remarkable to note how quickly Churchill's and Eden's governments used the idea of a non-Suez centered Middle Eastern defense organization as a key to Britain's interests in the Middle Eastern arena, and more importantly in this case in Anglo-Arab relations. What would become the Baghdad Pact was an institution that hinged on maintaining the status quo in the Middle Eastern power relationships cementing power structures that had been present in the region since the San Remo conference and the settlement

surrounding the portioning of the Ottoman Empire's former possessions but most importantly its Arab members. The "northern tier" of states were staunchly conservative and anti-communist and in Iraq's case the government was tightly connected to the British imperialist project. This is to say that as a matter of practice the defense alliance concept could be used to strengthen more than just the military ties between the "West" and the Middle Eastern governments that would be tied into the alliance.

It is necessary to give background on a few issues relating to the creation of the Baghdad Pact as a concept that would become the key to the Western defense strategies in the Middle East in the period after evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone was finalized in 1954.

The intersection of Abdul Nasser's view of using Egypt's position to promote an anti-imperialist and neutralist Arab foreign policy intersect with Jordan's domestic policies and its relations with the West in the winter of 1955-56 and Britain's wishes for Jordan to join its larger Hashemite cousin in the Baghdad Pact. Jordan would become another battle in the war between Abdul Nasser's views of anti-imperialist Arab nationalism and a British supported Arab monarchy, a conflict predicated upon Egypt's wish to replace Britain as the hegemonic power in the Hashemite states.

The hegemonic conflict in the Jordanian context is best shown to be the increasing of Egyptian and progressive Arab nationalist influence in Jordanian politics and society. Such as by the rise of opposition to the monarchy, British influence, best illustrated by John Glubb Pasha and the Arab Legion and the rise of nationalist forces such as the Jordanian National Movement and the Jordanian Free Officers led by Shahir Abu-Shahut.

The Baghdad Pact: 1954-1955

Regional Defense and Anglo-American Friction in the Middle East

The State Department led by John F. Dulles formulated policies which predicated greater United States involvement in order to secure American interests in Middle East one such policy was NSC 5428 "United States Objectives and Policies with Respect to the Near East."[157] It emphasized the creation of the "northern tier" defense concept as a main key to the region's defense as well as the disposition of military and fiscal aid to Middle Eastern states to assure their adherence to the new defense alliance. The National Security Council (NSC) in this document addressed stthe danger that socioeconomic and political position of the Middle East posed to Western interests in the region. NSC 5428 cites what it terms as "inimical trends" to keeping the states of the Middle East within the Western camp. Such as a new-found desire for Middle Eastern states to "assert their independence and are suspicious of outside interest in their affairs," especially when it came to states breaking away from their former colonial condition and now openly distrusting the French and the British. [158] A series of trends in which mainly Arab governments began to act on their own disregarding western wishes and focused on their own self-determination was among the largest problems that faced the Western powers in defense of the Middle East. The US government aimed to remedy this by working to create the "northern tier" defense concept.

The US government in advocating for the creation of an "indigenous regional defense

157FRUS, Statement of Policy by the National Security Council, 23 July 1954, *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-1954, Vol IX Part I* (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1986) p.525

158Ibid.

arrangement," based on the" northern tier" concept hinged on factors that are very informative to events that would take place in Jordan and Iraq in the course of their history of adherence to the Baghdad Pact. The NSC saw that the strengthening of the militaries of the pact's member states would "induce internal stability and political orientation towards the West." In formulating the "northern tier" concept, Foggy Bottom understood the problems of making it anything other than an "indigenous" organization limited to the "northern tier." Making the northern tier an organization without western involvement would assure the nationalists would not be opposed to it on a basis of renewing fears of Western imperialism in the Middle East. Second, confining the "northern tier" defense organization to Turkey, Iraq, Iran and Pakistan would minimize the impact that Saudi-Egyptian opposition and the issue of the Arab-Israeli conflict would play within the organization's internal dynamic.

American policy regarding Middle Eastern defense guided by NSC 5428 and the "northern tier" concept was concerned with strengthening the militaries and regimes of the member states as a way to stop Soviet incursion into the Middle East. It is plain to see that Dulles and the State Department had segregated the Middle East into "northern tier" with its emphasis on regional defense and conservative politics with Turkey as its most important state. On the other hand, the other countries in the Middle East were grouped into the Arab states whose primary concern was the Arab-Israeli conflict and Egypt had taken role as the most powerful state in this bloc. As this quote from the document shows

> "Neither encourage nor discourage other Arab states from asking to participate in regional security arrangements. In order to avoid creating harmful friction, treat sympathetically any overtures made, but bear in mind the importance of maintaining the indigenous nature of the organization and the desirability of concentrating

available U.S. military assistance.[159]

Both Egypt and Saudi Arabia opposed to the "northern tier" project but for very different reasons. The Saudis rejected Iraqi leadership based on the dynastic rivalry based on basic antagonism about the very existence of the Saudi state and Hashemite claims to the Hejaz. On the other hand Egypt's opposition to the "northern tier" was based largely on Egyptian claims to leadership of the Arab world. With another major factor being the character of the policies that the Iraqi government and its Prime Minister Nuri Said supported which were clearly opposed to Abdul Nasser's stances on foreign policy.

The "northern tier" concept originated in the State Department and was an idea sponsored by the United States government. But in reality was that all of the states in "northern tier" had closer relations to the Britain than the United States, especially in the case of Iran and Iraq, the two monarchies on which the British economy depended most for the flow of oil. Nigel John Ashton posits that British interest in joining the "northern tier" concept were based on a twofold concept of "defense" that have very different meanings. First of all the term defense can be looked at in the more traditional way which equates it with an exterior threat namely from the Soviet Union and the need to organize military responses to it. It was also necessary assistance to make this scheme, which fell in line with Dulles' vision with the "northern tier" project as a defensive alliance aimed at curbing Soviet expansion. On other hand "defense" according to Ashton was based on "habit of empire" and the "legacy of informal empire" which meant that the British government saw defense through the lens of its former imperial ambition meaning that it could be seen more as a political concept more than only a military one. Ashton makes the case that British policymakers wanted to assure the strength of local regimes when,

159 Ibid.

> a state could equally well be subverted from within by the establishment of a regime inimical to Western interests the 'defence' came to imply the maintenance of influence over governments in the area. Whilst this form of defence had the benefit of guaranteeing interests without the need for ususstainable military expenditure. It could justly be described as form of colonialism.[160]

Britain's basis for this emphasis on "defense" as a form of pseudo-colonial control of Middle Eastern regimes was based on pragmatic, "empirical assessments" and not on ideology and played a major role in its Middle Eastern decision-making.[161] A major part of the equation was Britain's desire to renegotiate the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty which would expire in 1957 as well as concluding some sort of multilateral agreement for regional defense as outlined in a memorandum written to the cabinet by Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden in March of 1955.[162] Eden's take on the agreement differed from what Dulles and the State Department working in conjunction with the National Security Council had ultimately outlined in NSC 5428 above. The United States government saw the "northern tier" as indigenous defense arrangement with no Western involvement in it. Eden's language in this memorandum states that the Foreign Office and the cabinet thought that accession to the Turco-Iraqi agreement "should provide first, a framework for future defence co-operation between the Western Powers and the countries of the Middle East." More importantly, Britain's concern in joining the alliance hinged on its use as "an instrument which will enable us to replace the existing Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930." [163] Considering the loss of the Suez Canal Zone in 1954, the British government was hoping to

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160Ashton, Nigel John. 1993. "The Hijacking of a Pact: The Formation of the Baghdad Pact and Anglo-American Tensions in the Middle East, 1955-1958". *Review of International Studies.* 19 (2): 123-137. p.124

161Ibid.

162PRO, Middle East Defence: The Turco-Iraqi Agreement and Revision of the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1930. 14 March, 1955. CAB 129/74

163 PRO, Memorandum CAB 129/74

solidify its strategic position in the region and the best way to do so was to accede to the Turco-Iraqi agreement.

The key to this was the renegotiation of the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi Treaty and its most important provision, the right for the Royal Air Force to use the airfields at Shaiba and Habbaniya. The highlights of which included the rights for the British to use both of the air bases (although they would nominally revert to Iraqi control), the right to have maintenance crews and facilities, the right for the British military to pre-stock supplies in Iraq along with integration and cooperation between the Royal Air Force and Royal Iraqi Air Force.[164] In return for this the British government agreed to sell the Iraqi government Centurion tanks through "off-shoring" them through the United States. The first twelve of which would be delivered in 1955, ten by the United States and two by the British.[165] In a telegram sent to Prime Minister Eden from President Eisenhower in March of 1956 the United States government agreed to supply forty more Centurion tanks "only because there are firm understandings that these tanks will not be used for any purpose except defense of the area in connection with the Baghdad Pact."[166]

Anglo-American differences on the Baghdad Pact are an important point of departure for analyzing multilateral relationships within the Arab world. The United States saw the Baghdad Pact as an organization was aimed at regional defense in the traditional sense. Much like NATO or SEATO, the Baghdad Pact was in the State Department's and the National Security Council's eyes an instrument to contain Soviet military ambitions in the Middle East. This is why they

164 Ibid.

165 FRUS. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Iraq. 21 August 1955, Foreign Relations of the United States, Volume XIII, Washington D.C FRUS 1991 p.971

166 FRUS. Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom, 6 March 1956. FRUS VOL XIII p.992

aimed to make it into an institution free of Western involvement and as mentioned in NSC 5428 "indigenous" and not involving itself in the dangerous arena of Arab politics. The United States was not opposed to British accession to the Baghdad Pact as its supply of British Centurion tanks to Iraq shows. But what was different were the goals of each particular state in the creation of the agreement.

The British government taking in the failures of the post-war attempts to renegotiate the 1936 Anglo-Egyptian treaty and to form a Suez centered defense organization saw the Turco-Iraqi agreement as an opportunity. Eden in his time as Foreign Secretary and as Prime Minister used the concept of coalescing of the Baghdad Pact as a way to ensure Britain's strategic interests in the region. The Baghdad Pact also served to strengthen the Iraqi government by renegotiating the 1930 Anglo-Iraqi treaty to be more favorable to Iraqi public opinion. This was the main reason why the Foreign Office and the Royal Air Force made concessions that gave the appearance of larger independence of the Royal Iraqi Air Force over the air bases at Shaiba and Habbaniya, such as nominal sovereignty and the non-permanence of RAF squadrons at the Iraqi air bases. The United States government recognized that the Baghdad Pact could strengthen Middle Eastern regimes and that it could be used to ensure better privileges for Western powers. There was still Anglo-American disagreement of the basic *raison d'etre* of the Baghdad Pact as a tool of Western policy, the British wanted to use it to strengthen ties between the West and the Middle East. However, the United States government saw the most benefit in keeping a hands off approach and hoping that the conservative nature of the "northern tier" states would lead them towards the conclusion of working together against Soviet expansion in the Middle East. This difference of opinion is especially pertinent when the question of the Baghdad Pact is raised in the context of intra-Arab politics and the question of Jordan's accession to the treaty and

Egyptian opposition as another battle fought to free the Arab world of British influence in its many forms, economic, social, political and military.

Egyptian Opposition to the Baghdad Pact
Egyptian-Iraqi Rivalry, Arab Unity

The context of Egyptian opposition to the Turco-Iraqi Pact and especially of British accession to the agreement and its expansion into Jordan was the major issue of Arab politics in 1955 and the early part of 1956. Abdul Nasser and the Revolutionary Command Council took a view that the Turco-Iraqi pact and later after Britain's accession the Baghdad Pact was antithetical to Egyptian desires in the sphere of Arab politics and especially the concept of Arab "unity" which centered on Egyptian leadership of the Arab world. Egypt's foreign policy was driven by opposition to the Iraq breaking from the Arab camp and siding with the West instead of Egypt. The Egypt-Syria-Saudi Pact was projected by the Egyptian government as a way to counter Iraqi and British influence, which Abdul Nasser thought harmful to Arab interests as this alignment could be seen as a new form of British imperialism in the Arab World.

Egyptian opposition to the Turco-Iraqi pact was articulated by Abdul Nasser and members of his government such as Foreign Minister Mohammad Fawzi early and often in conversations with British and American diplomats in Egypt. The Egyptian government saw the Turco-Iraqi pact construct as unnatural to Nasser pictured were the necessities for regional defense and defense of Arab countries. Which focused on strengthening each individual Arab state and then coordinating them together "into a larger unit of strength," and that Arab states were not ready to accept Iraq bringing itself into association with Western states through its

alliance with Turkey and NATO. Fawzi said "it is not wise for anybody to try and force the kicking and screaming Arab world into a position for which it is unready." He also asserted to the American embassy that the Turco-Iraqi pact was "fomented by the West," and was effort to "destroy Arab unity."[167] This line moved forward by the Egyptian government is a familiar argument, that by Iraq associating itself with Turkey and signing an agreement sponsored by "Western" power and Ankara it had made itself a subject to "imperialism" and was a way for Iraq to isolate Egypt in the Arab sphere. Prime Minister Abdul Nasser exposed his thoughts on the Turco-Iraqi pact and Iraq's intentions to American Ambassador Henry Byroade. Abdul Nasser thought that the Turco-Iraqi pact was a way for the Hashemites and Nuri Said to pursue their "fertile Crescent ambitions and to isolate Egypt," within the Arab world.[168] Abdul Nasser's opposition to the Turco-Iraqi pact was based on a basic disagreement of the nature of Arab unity and inter-Arab relations. Nasser aimed for Egypt and the Arab world to be neutral, independent, and free of Western involvement in Arab politics. Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said saw no problem of associating Iraqi with Turkey and Britain in a treaty that aligned him with the "West" and against the Soviet Union.

Nuri Said's position regarding regional defense and unity was chiefly concerned with the concept sponsored by the State Department and Secretary Dulles as outlined in NSC 5428, as an anti-communist arrangement. Nuri said this of the communist threat to the Middle East and Egyptian opposition to the Turco-Iraqi pact,

> The Communists, he told them, might be in Formosa tomorrow and the next day "right here in our midst." The door was open to them all to join in an agreement to meet this

167FRUS, From the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 17 January, 1955. FRUS VOL XII

168Foreign Office, From Cairo to Foreign Office, Cairo 11 March 1955. FO 371/11497

> threat. He was not going to be told by any outsider, however, when Iraq should sign the proposed Turkish-Iraq pact. He was going to move ahead with the drafting of the pact and its signing. He would, however, be prepared to accommodate his moves to reasonable wishes of neighboring states if they showed a real willingness to become associated.[169]

Nuri also said he was only responsible to the Iraqi people and to his parliament and not to Abdul Nasser and to Egypt's government and he would go ahead with his plans to conclude the treaty with Turkey despite Egyptian opposition.[170] The generally anti-Communist chord struck by Nuri and the Iraqis shows their emphasis on regional defense that hinged on the support of the Western powers in any such agreement. Nuri Said's emphasis was on associating Iraq with an anti-Communist and pro-Western alignment that he saw as being advantageous to the state's position especially as relating to the sections above. Where the question of Iraq's adherence to what was still called the "northern tier" concept was sewn up by an Anglo-American promise of Centurion tanks to Iraqi army. Nuri's pro-Western alignment was precisely what brought so much Egyptian opposition to Iraq's leadership of the Turco-Iraqi pact.

On the other hand, Abdul Nasser's emphasis in opposing the Turco-Iraqi pact was driven simply the fact the he did not see the merit of Arab states joining in any defensive agreement that would bring them into alignment with the West. Abdul Nasser stressed what he called first strengthening the "internal front" of Arab states before dealing with the problem of the "external front."[171] What Prime Minister Abdul Nasser meant by this "internal front" was to first assure that Arab states were secure themselves before worrying with external defense. And that Western involvement in Arab affairs was not in the best interest of the Arab world and would result in a

169FRUS, Telegram from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, 3 February 1955, FRUS Vol. XII p.11

170FRUS, Telegram from the Embassy in Iraq to the Department of State, 17 January 1955, FRUS Vol. XII p.7

171FRUS, Telegram from the Embassy in Egypt to the Department of State, 6 February 1955, FRUS Vol. XII p.15

backlash against the West and Western supported regimes such as Nuri Said and the Hashemites in Iraq. Abdul Nasser posits that through Western support of the pact, “within six months [the] pact would have caused Communist and nationalists in Iraq to be drawn together by same old fears of foreign domination, British and American 'imperialism' and 'colonialism.'” Although Abdul Nasser would be wrong about Nuri and the Hashemites staying in power for only six more months but he was right about the general unpopularity of the Baghdad Pact and Western involvement in Arab affairs in Arab politics for the period 1955-1958. Altogether the basis of Egyptian opposition to the Baghdad Pact was built upon the concerns that Abdul Nasser had and even the more radical Wafdists had been concerned with for the longest time, anti-Imperialism. Alongside new concern for neutralism that had driven Prime Minister Abdul Nasser's thought as option to put Egypt in the best situation for leadership of the Arab nation.

A substantial portion of Egyptian opposition to the Baghdad Pact was shown by Abdul Nasser's invective against Britain acceding to the treaty thus making it a truly Western led organization that would first focus on Western interests and not on Egyptian and Arab needs. Abdul Nasser's anti-imperialism was a key to Egypt's foreign policy and its self-imposed leadership role in the Arab world. A major party in the anti-imperialist line being put forth by Cairo was the Egyptian media that was largely in step with the government's views and also opposed British involvement in Arab affairs. The role of the Egyptian media was also a major theme in Egypt's dealings with Jordan's possible accession to the Baghdad Pact.

The newspapers *Akhbar el Yom*, *Gomhouria* and *Al-Ahram* were all opposed to Britain's accession to the Turco-Iraqi pact, *Al-Ahram's* headline screamed “ Britain has gained a new base

In Iraq," and its editorial said that Nuri "had sold his country to the imperialists.[172] *Gomhouria* also made anti-imperialist remarks the next day regarding Britain's accession and the renegotiation of the Anglo-Iraqi Special agreement, saying that it would extend British occupation of Iraq and made it "into a virtual British protectorate." It also brought up the 1948 Portsmouth Treaty riots and posited, "the Iraqi people would sooner or later rise to 'tear up not only the Said-Menders pact but also the new Anglo-Iraqi Agreement which had imposed foreign occupation on the country."[173] The anti-imperialist line taken by the Egyptian press relating to Britain's adherence to the Baghdad Pact was much the same as the government's. This was not surprising considering the connections between Mohammed Hasanayn Haykal a prominent Egyptian journalist for *Al-Ahram,* the Free Officers and then Colonel Abdul Nasser as early 1952.[174] Egyptian anti-imperialism created by Abdul Nasser's desire as mentioned earlier to maintain unity among Arab states. Abdul Nasser posited the thesis that " neither his own country nor any other Arab people is ripe for alliance with the West, and that any such alliance should be negotiated with the Arab states as a whole and after all vestiges of imperialism have disappeared from them."[175] Anti-imperialism aimed at giving more independence to Egypt and her Arab sisters was a major portion of Abdul Nasser's foreign policy to oppose further British involvement in the Arab world. Furthermore, Abdul Nasser's own concept of neutralism was based on Egyptian opposition to foreign intervention in Arab politics.

A conversation between Secretary Dulles and the Lebanese Ambassador in Washington

172 From Stevenson to Foreign Office Cairo 4 April 1955FO 371/111505

173Ibid.

174Copeland, Miles. 1970. *The game of nations; the amorality of power politics*. New York: Simon and Schuster. p.63

175 Foreign Office, From Stevenson to Shuckburgh,Cairo 23 May 1955 FO 371/115514

attributed Egypt's attitude towards Iraq and the question of the Turco-Iraqi pact as mainly centered on " a deep strain of neutralism in that country of a type which did not exist in any significant way in Iraq or Lebanon," along with a rivalry with Iraq and Turkey.[176] But the importance of Abdul Nasser's new-found neutralism cannot be ignored as a source of his enmity towards the pro-Western position held by Iraq, Prime Minister Nuri Said and the Turco-Iraqi pact.

Nasser's neutralism was informed by the historical memory of informal British empire in Egypt and the fact the he wished Egypt and other Arab states to seek out their own self-interests in a context where they could dictate their own foreign policies as each country wished. Neutralism for Nasser in this period was a determination to make the most of Egypt's newfound political independence in the foreign policy arena and his wish for Egypt to dictate its own terms in foreign affairs not beholden to Moscow, London or Washington. Neutralism was a "third way" where states like Egypt can go their own way and not slavishly follow the position of some other larger more powerful power. Nasser said in a speech to Egyptian army officers in March of 1955,

> Communism has been considered a danger, but I still believe that imperialism or domination of us by the other side represents another danger. We area state which lived under the yoke of imperialism for 75 years in the form of British occupation. I consider that Egypt at present, now that she is beginning one phase of liberation, must rid herself completely of every foreign influence so that she can stand on her own feet. After that, if she finds that it is in her interest to conclude an agreement with another state on a basis of equality, she will conclude that agreement to further her interests; but she will never do so as a result of pressure ... But we fear Western domination as well as the communist danger, and on this ground the defence of this area must come from the states of the area and from its sons without any foreign intervention. If you consider that arming us will be consistent with your interests in any way, then give us arms.[177]

176FRUS, Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Lebanese Ambassador (Malik) and the Secretary of State, Department of State, Washington, 9 February 1955. FRUS, Vol XII, 1991

177Podeh, Elie. 1996. "The Drift towards Neutrality: Egyptian Foreign Policy during the Early Nasserist Era, 1952-55" *Middle Eastern Studies.* 32 (1): 159-178. p.170-171

Prime Minister Abdul Nasser's view on neutralism as a policy position was a middle path in the context of Cold War politics where Abdul Nasser rejected both Nehru's positing of total neutrality or Nuri's "outright identification with the West." If neutralism was to infer a rejection of domination by either the Communist or Western worlds, Egypt's plans to create defense organizations centered on Arab countries and without western support perfectly show what Abdul Nasser saw as being neutral in the practical sense. Abdul Nasser's support for a "collective security [system] freely organized by the peoples of the region themselves,"[178] would be manifested by Egyptian leadership in creating the Egypt-Syria-Saudi Pact as an Arab option to the Baghdad Pact.

Anti-imperialism and neutralism as bases for Egyptian opposition to the Baghdad Pact were successful enough drivers of Arab public opinion that these two pillars would be the key to Egypt and her allies toppling British imperialism influence in Jordan. The arguments laid out above by Abdul Nasser himself was, the case for positive neutralism as the best solution for Arab problems. The Egyptian press showed how anti-imperialism and nationalism should be the most important determinants of national foreign policy. Both of these tactics used throughout the Anglo-Egyptian fight over Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact. Another major strand that Nasser had understood from observing relations between Western states and Middle Eastern ones was the power of military and economic aid as a tool to convince a government to fall in line with your own preferred position.

178Podeh, p.172

Conclusion

There are a number of salient points that to be culled from the discussion of the "northern tier" defense concept and its eventual realization as the Baghdad Pact. First, Anglo-American policy in the Middle East during the 1950s did not always mesh. While the United States envisioned the "northern tier" concept as an organization that would contain Soviet expansion in the Middle East on an "indigenous" bases and outside of the intrigue of inter-Arab politics the British saw it otherwise. The British aimed to make the "northern tier" concept a way to secure their imperial interests in the region, especially Iraqi and Iranian oil and the series of treaties Britain had signed with Arab states. This is the main reason the British leveraged Nuri Said and the Iraqi government to conclude agreements with Turkey in return for military and financial aid. The British put their interests, oil and friendly regimes over the American's first concern containment of the Soviet threat.

For Gamal Abdul Nasser the issue of the Baghdad Pact was a major one in crafting Egyptian foreign policy relating to the neutralism, anti-imperialism and Arab unity. Abdul Nasser's anti-imperialist views also influenced his views on neutralism, which emphasized that the Arab states should be independent of "Western" influences and free chose whatever path was most appropriate for each case. Egyptian foreign policy rejected imperialism from all sides be it Washington, London or Moscow. Abdul Nasser also emphasized Arab unity as a way for Arab states to strengthen themselves and be better prepared in the case of outside threats. The theme of unity was also influenced by anti-imperialism, because of Egyptian-Iraqi rivalry and Abdul Nasser's personal dislike of Prime Minister Nuri Said. Abdul Nasser claimed that the Iraqis were trying to isolate Egypt and take the Arab world with them into an alliance with Turkey and

Britain. Egypt's opposition to the Baghdad Pact and its support for anti-imperialist policies, neutralism and Arab unity were major themes to Anglo-Egyptian relations during the 1950s It shaped the events in Jordan regarding that country's accession to the Baghdad Pact, the dismissal of General John Glubb and the "Arabization" of the Arab Legion early in 1956.

CHAPTER 4: THE JORDANIAN *EFFENDIYYA* AND ANTI-IMPERIALIST NATIO ALISM:

THE JORDANIAN NATIONAL MOVEMENT, THE FREE OFFICERS GROUP AND BRITISH INFORMAL EMPIRE IN JORDAN.

The domestic politics of each country is as important if not more so than the international level politics in positing a reason for the reasons why historical events unfold as they did. Much as in the previous chapter, I want to stress the particular sociopolitical and economic actors that played a major role in challenging British and Hashemite hegemony in Jordan, the *effendiyya*, the young army officers and Palestinians both refugees and not refugees. Jordanian nationalist opposition to British influence and the role played by General John Glubb and the Arab Legion are best explained in the context of Robert Cox's neo-Gramscian analysis of power and international political economy. Especially, the importance of civil society and the war of position to the end of overt British influence in Jordan. The Jordanian state emphasized public education as a method to assure its legitimacy among its own people. In turn, the expansion of the educational system, created a new class of Arab nationalist intellectuals who were opposed to the Hashemite dynasty and British influence These, "*effendis"* the Jordanian petty bourgeoisie, civil servants, junior army officers, school teachers and professionals comprised what Robert Cox termed a civil society, a "mobilized participant citizenry juxtaposed to dominant economic and state power."[179] The main role of a civil society in this context is to fight the long war of position against the entrenched hegemonic classes, the royal family, the palace and the British

179Cox, Civil Society, p.6

leadership of the Arab legion The War of position is fought in society and is opposed to the hegemonic power in the state. The parties of the Jordanian National Movement and the Free Officers group in the Arab Legion were the vanguard of passive revolution in Jordan. The JNM and the Free Officers supported, the "*effendis"* against the exclusionary sociopolitical elite. It was in this context that Britain sought to incorporate Jordan into the Baghdad Pact.

These actors together served to create a major challenge to Anglo-Hashemite hegemony in Jordan by forcing the ouster of John Bagot Glubb and the "Arabization" of the Arab Legion. But also is important to note is the prevalence of Egyptian and Saudi influence in Jordan during 1955-56 and how apparatuses of the Egyptian position such as Radio Cairo and the program "Voice of the Arabs" helped to carry and anti-British, anti-imperialist and Pan-Arab view of the world. This helped to cement some ideas among the Arabs and led the Jordanian people to get rid of their current hegemonic class the Hejazi Hashemites supported by British military installations and institutions

Jordan and Informal British Empire: Hegemony, The Hashemites and The Arab Legion.

The nature of the top social strata of the Jordanian state are important to ascertaining what could legitimately be called the Hashemite bases for hegemonic power in their desert Kingdom. From the beginning of the British Mandate, what was then Transjordan was seen "as an artificial creation sustained by its connection with Britain."[180] Further, Transjordan served as a strategic link between the two more economically and politically important states that bordered it;

180Blackwell, Stephen. 2009. *British military intervention and the struggle for Jordan: King Hussein, Nasser and the Middle East crisis, 1955-1958*. New York: Routledge. p.11

on the east, Iraq and the west, Palestine.[181] During 1920s and 1930s, the Transjordanian entity was strengthened against Saudi Arabian designs because of John Bagot Glubb's Desert Patrol Force which would become the Arab Legion in 1939. The personage of "Glubb Pasha" was seen as the "embodiment" of Transjordan to the outside world. Emir Abdullah asked Glubb to "regard himself as a Transjordanian in all circumstances save a conflict with his own countrymen; and Glubb himself admitted he was "an adventurer who has taken service as mercenary with a foreign government."[182] Along with Glubb Pasha's military authority and British need for a strategic bridge between Palestine and Iraq another major source of legitimation for the Hashemite monarchy was the Bedouin tribes under the aegis of Glubb's Arab Legion. Stephen Blackwell says that the Bedouin rather than urban population were the,

> "ultimate guarantors of Abdullah's rule had profound consequences for the emerging state. The basis of the nation was the Bedouin-dominated military, which was developed by Glubb and other British officers as a syncretism of British army and supposed tribal traditions.[183]

Ultimately the exercise of power by the Hashemites and British in Jordan were assured by the king maintaining legitimacy with the Bedouin tribes while Glubb would maintain his power and "influential and prestigious position in the Arab Legion."[184] Besides the Bedouin, the supporters of the Jordanian Hashemite entity boil down to ruler and the Hejazi members of his extended family, "the king's friends, perhaps a score of individuals of differing origin who usually held key positions in the king's retinue and the court." Another major source of power were

181Blackwell, p.11

182Ibid.

183Ibid p.12

184Ibid, p.14

Jordanians who lived in the villages and small towns of the River Jordan's East Bank.[185] The Hashemites depended on the first two sources of legitimacy first in maintaining and exercising their power in the Emirate and then the Kingdom, the British in the form of Glubb and the Arab Legion and the Bedouin tribes. The Arab Legion and Glubb depended on the Bedouin tribes as the source of its power while the monarchy in Amman depended on both Arab Legion and the Bedouin tribes as a source of its legitimacy. A major downside of this arrangement was that Glubb's presence in the Kingdom that came with his leadership of the Arab Legion made Jordan into a part of Britain's informal empire in the Middle East. This made it possible for critics of the king and the monarchy both inside and outside of Jordan to claim that the Hashemites were nothing more than British "puppets" "stooges" and subjected to British imperialism which preyed on Jordanian dignity and national aspirations.

The nature of British imperial influence in Jordan was expensive but it also was strategically important. In essence the British government paid a £10 million subsidy yearly to the Jordanians and received in return "military transit and base rights; the services of the British-trained and officered Arab Legion; a sphere of abiding British political influence in the Middle East."[186] This assessment by William Rountree at Foggy Bottom is as true today as it was in November of 1956, Jordan's importance to the British in the Middle East lay in the basic loyalty that they expected from the Arab Legion which was essentially a British institution in an Arab state. Along with having certain imperial privileges that had become more important in the wake

185Dann, Uriel. 1989. *King Hussein and the challenge of Arab radicalism: Jordan 1955-1967*. New York: Oxford University Press in cooperation with the Moshe Dayan Center for Middle Eastern and African Studies, Tel Aviv University. p.4

186 FRUS. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs (Rountree)to the Acting Secretary of State, 26 November 1956, Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-57 Volume XII Government Printing Office.

of the evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone in 1954, such as the use of air bases in Jordan and the right to use Jordanian territory as a staging ground for British military operations. Keeping these considerations in mind let us enter into the reasons why the British saw it as imperative for Jordan to adhere to the Baghdad Pact regardless of its current treaty relations with the Hashemite Kingdom.

Opposition to the Hashemite entity came as it did in Egypt under Farouk from what Cox calls the petty bourgeoisie in his Gramscian terminology and scholar of the 20th century Arab Middle East have termed the "*effendiyya."* These "*effendis",* urban professionals, doctors, lawyers, journalists and teachers from both sides of the Jordan river joined the parties of the Jordanian National Movement (JNM). The JNM was a collection of leftist political parties, the Ba'th, Communist and National Socialist Parties along with the Movement of Arab Nationalists became hugely influential in Jordanian politics that King Hussein allowed for Sulayman al-Nabulsi leader of the NSP to form a government composed of nationalist-socialist elements.[187] A leading source of power of the JNM was the fact that both native Jordanians and Palestinians had enough in common in the wake of the Second World War and the failures caused by the problems of the British Mandate and the successes of the Zionist project. This common ground catalyzed under the

> umbrella of Arab nationalism. In it, Jordanian and Palestinian activists formed the progressive and Arab nationalist political parties of the JNM, designed to garner support for revolutionizing the Hashemite governmental structure. The urban professional stratum of both communities led the parties to mobilize the increasingly urbanized population.[188]

187Anderson, Betty S. 2005. *Nationalist voices in Jordan: the street and the state*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press. p.4, p.119

188Anderson, Nationalist Voices, p.118

Much like the Wafd in Egypt the parties of the JNM led by these politicized and mobilized Arab nationalist *effendiyya* was a "new" force in Jordanian politics which stood up to the "old" Hashemite system. The parties of the JNM called for "socioeconomic justice, political reform, Arab unity, and a return of Palestine," and both Palestinians and Jordanians responded with thousands of them going to the streets throughout the 1950s. These progressive Arab politics based themselves on the issues of Arab unity and political reform.[189]

The JNM's impetus for expansion during the 1950s took place alongside a "massive school expansion program" which increased school enrollment by 113 percent and increased the number of teachers by 209 percent between 1951 and 1961.[190] The JNM's leaders used schools and teachers to recruit students as activists and made schools a locus for party cells. These teachers graduated from universities in the surrounding Arab countries and were not bashful about the teaching Arab nationalist revolutionary slogans they had learned in university as a part of their curricula even for teachers in the sciences and mathematics. One such teacher, Munif al-Razzaz, a science teacher in a public school in Amman said that besides teaching science he would leave "a place for nationalism and culture and ethics...I occasionally read to them from literary journals and occasionally I took the opportunity to teach anthems that had the spirit of nationalism." al-Razzaz said all of this was done outside of the classroom.[191] As a result of all this political mobilization of secondary school students along with the fact that there was no university in Jordan until 1962, the JNM's activists were secondary school students at home and

189Ibid.

190Ibid, p.119

191Ibid, p.120

university students abroad. These students organized a Jordanian Student Union that met every year during the 1950s, the students also wrote for newspapers and set up political lectures and most importantly they recruited other students to join the Movement's political parties. They came out in large number throughout the decade to protest against the Hashemites and the British.[192] "*Effendis,"* especially politically mobilized ones, were made not born,and the logical answer is to look for cohorts of the population that had gone through secondary school and thus had the qualifications to become a professional, to join the civil service or become an officer in the military. The political mobilization of secondary school students in Jordan is an important phenomenon in explaining why the parties of Jordanian National Movement were so popular and strong during the 1950s.

The Jordanian National Movement's political parties were with the exception of the National Socialist Party "branches of larger organizations outside of Jordan," their goal was to create a "new" more equal Arab union to replace to replace the "old" Hashemite state. They planned to do this by appealing to people's anger at the situation in Jordan and used simple slogans such as "Arab Unity" and "anti-imperialism." All of the parties were in some way socialist ranging from Marxism to the special constructs of the mixture of public and private industrial and agricultural enterprise that defined their brand of Arab socialism. They also focused much of their attention on the person of John Bagot Glubb, "as the source of innumerable problems within Jordan. He represented for them continuing British control over the state and the Hashemite acquiescence to it."[193] The Arab nationalist parties argued that Arab unity and the end of Jordan's existence as a separate state and the end of "imperialist divisions"

192 Ibid, p.120-21

193Anderson, p.132

in the Fertile Crescent, meaning that the wish for Arab unity would ultimately also relieve socioeconomic pain that imperialism had caused the Arabs in the past.[194]

An important source of opposition to the Hashemites and to British imperialism in Jordan was Jordan's Arab officers who with their morale devastated by the Arab defeat in 1948 War sought a channel to express their frustration with their situation. Although the British military officers who joined the Arab Legion leading up to the War in 1948 "tried to exhaust the Jordanian officers with excessive training exercises to prevent them from having the time to join or form political groupings, the level of despair among many of the recently trained Jordanian officers had to find a political outlet."[195] But as often happens "disciplines can break down, counteract one another, or overreach," allowing for a space for counter-hegemonic actors to operate in the space left by the contradictions. One such opportunity was taken up by Jordanian artillery officers who in the summer of 1948 started the weekly magazine *al-Qunbulah* or "The Bomb," where they expressed their opposition to "the prevailing order."

Glubb Pasha ordered the magazine to shut down through a verbal warning, telling the Jordanian officers to "put a stop to his childish behavior." But the larger takeaway from the founding of *al-Qunbulah* was the fact that nationalist Jordanian officers were able to make connections with civilian nationalists such as Hisham Nashashibi from Ramallah in the West Bank who published his own magazine *Al-Jil al-Jadid* or "The New Generation."[196] In 1952, inspired by the coup d'etat in Egypt, a number of officers initially with Ba'thist nationalist

194Ibid.

195Massad, Joseph Andoni. 2001. *Colonial effects: the making of national identity in Jordan*. New York: Columbia University Press. p.165

196Massad, Colonial effects, p.165-166

ideology such as Shahir Abu Shahut started the Movement of Jordanian Free Officers (*Harakat al-Dubbat al-Urduniyyin al-Ahrar*). Some of its most prominent members would be very important in events that would transpire within the kingdom for the next few years men such as 'Ali al-Hiyari, 'Ali Abu-Nuwwar and Habis al-Majali.

The Jordanian Free Officers acted against Glubb's wishes that the Emir Talal would not accede to the throne following the assassination of King Abdullah in 1951. 'Ali Abu-Nuwwar and a Palestinian Jordanian doctor 'Awmi Hannun made sure that Talal should succeed to throne (despite being mentally incapable). Talal did so without military intervention. But this event makes it clear that nationalism and anti-imperialism as well as opposition to Glubb Pasha was strong enough by the end of Talal's reign that the Jordanian Free Officers were a force to be reckoned with in Jordanian politics. A coalition formed in Jordan centered around nationalist politicians, nationalist officers and the young "and increasingly nationalistic king."[197] Abu-Shahut the leader of the Jordanian Free Officers made contacts with Syrian and Egyptian nationalist military elements, the "Syrians suggested that the Jordanian Free Officers undertake a campaign of blowing up British air force jets as well as a campaign of of assassinating British officers." The Jordanian officers refused to carry out ideas saying that they were anti-colonial nationalists and "not a band of thugs."[198] The Jordanian Free Officers become increasingly more assertive in their campaign to rid their country of foreign influence personified by Glubb Pasha and the Arab Legion. Nationalist Jordanian officers opposed Glubb Pasha as the embodiment of British influence in Jordan. However, another problem was his opposition to educated Arab officers.

197Ibid, p.171

198Ibid, p.173

The Jordanian Army, consisting of both the Arab Legion and the National Guard increased in size from six thousand men in 1948 to twenty-five thousand Legionnaires along with another thirty thousand in the National Guard by 1956. Glubb Pasha despite this massive expansion in the army maintained a hostile position to educated Arabs. This "manifested itself in Glubb's refusal to promote the young educated officers in favor of the existing officers and Bedouin officers with little, if any education," along with many young educated officers being dismissed by Glubb from the army when "their political views became known to Glubb."[199] The young King Hussein sympathized with his young countrymen and articulated his position as it regards Glubb plans regarding "Arabization" of the army,

> Throughout the Army this led to a fantastic situation in which the British dominated our military affairs to a great degree. Around me I saw junior Arab officers who would obviously never become leaders. Some of the men were lacking in ability and force, men prepared to bow to Whitehall's commands, men who had no spark, men without initiative and who could be trusted not to cause any problems. These were "officer material." [w [while]Those with nationalist aspirations, who hoped for a Jordanian Arab Legion, never had an opportunity for promotion, and when they did they were to unimportant positions with no promise of advancement. I demanded that the British should prepare more Jordanian officers and train them for the higher echelons of the armed forces. Time after time my requests were ignored.[200]

Both the nationalist officers and King Hussein saw the nationalization of the army as being something that should happen concurrently with the nationalization of the rest of the state. Hussein's nationalism expressed itself in opposition to Glubb and British influence in his kingdom; he wanted to build a balanced a military, to have an offensive plan to retaliate against Israeli incursions into the West Bank and for his own people to have a chance to rise in their own

199 Ibid, p.177

200 Ibid, p.179

military.[201] Anti-imperialist nationalism in Jordan had by 1955 spread itself from the *effendiyya* on both banks of the Jordan river, the army and even the young and idealistic king, but what exactly was driving this process of mobilization of the Jordanians against British influence?

Abdul Nasser, Great Britain and The Baghdad Pact: Arab Unity, Anti-Imperialism and the Question of Jordan

It was plain to see that the issue of the Baghdad Pact was a major catalyst for Egyptian opposition to Western, namely British influence, in the Arab World. Nasser argued for anti-imperialism, positive neutrality and Arab unity as the most effective ways to counter British influence in the Arab states. On the domestic level nationalists in Jordan had their own problem with British influence in their matters, namely the Arab Legion and its leader Glubb Pasha. The parties of the Jordanian National Movement and the Jordanian Free Officers' saw Glubb as the personification of the problem of British informal empire in Jordan. The Free Officers and King Hussein concentrated on the issue of "Arabization" of the Arab Legion and the disrespect with which Glubb treated nationalist Arab officers, arguably making the Arab Legion a weaker fighting force while it still remaining more powerful guarantor of British interests in Jordan. The parties of the JNM had programmes that ran parallel to Nasser's wishes for the Arab world, namely Arab unity, anti-imperialism and a greater account for social justice to make the people's lives better. The Jordanian Free Officers and the JNM were not actors necessarily beholden to Abdul Nasser or Egypt directly but many of their ideas resembled proposals and concepts championed by Abdul Nasser. British interests in expanding the Baghdad Pact were marked by the speed in which they acceded to the Turco-Iraqi Pact in April of 1955 as a solution to the dual

201Ibid, p.180-181

problem of "defense" as outlined by Nigel John Ashton above. On November 24th 1955 the Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan said that the Baghdad Pact was Britain's "grand design" in Middle Eastern affairs and he said the British government should pursue a policy directed towards "bringing Jordan into the Pact as quickly as possible. This would inevitably entail a revision of our treaty with that country in favour of a less tutelary instrument and we should have to make some concessions, although we should try to keep these to a minimum."[202] 10 Downing Street and Whitehall were blunt in their wishes to have Jordan accede to Baghdad Pact and they moved accordingly by sending the Chief of the Imperial General Staff Sir Gerald Templer to negotiate Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact.

In his report for the reasons of the failure of his mission General Templer outlined a number of reasons that put into sharp relief the power that the JNM and the Jordanian Free Officer's held in Jordan's sociopolitical environment by the time of Templers' visit in December of 1955. Templer put much emphasis on the power of the "West Bank Ministers" as a reason why his mission failed. Mentioned was the importance in the Jordanian cabinet's mind of "the Palestine problem to the exclusion of anything else." Along with the "intransigence and unexpected guts of the West Bank Ministers" and the fact that the West Bank minsters said that they feared for their lives if they allowed Jordan to accede to the Pact without gaining in return concessions on the refugee problem.[203] West Bank issues, especially the issues of refugees were of massive importance to the parties of the Jordanian National Movement. Thusly the West Bank ministers who opposed any deal that would give any more power to the Hashemites and the Arab

202 PRO, 43rd Conclusions, 24 November 1955. London. CAB 128/29

203 Foreign Office, Report by General Sir Gerald Templer. Chief of Imperial General Staff on his visit to Jordan 16 December 1955. London. FO 437/7

Legion instead of focusing on the problem of Palestinian Jordanians both in camps and in the general population in the West Bank. Opposition to the Baghdad Pact in this case was a domestic issue centered on the issue of the West Bank and the Palestinians in Jordan. But Egypt also played a major role in influencing the Jordanian government's decision in acceding to the Baghdad Pact.

General Templer also noted that a major problem in reaching an agreement was the fact that the Jordanians included "fear of alienating Egypt" along with the "attitude of the press which as far as it took a line at all, was unfavourable."[204] Egypt's policies concerning the Baghdad Pact cited above are more ideological than actually practical. Abdul Nasser opposed the Baghdad Pact for all of those reasons but what is more important to note is what they actually did to avoid the problems they saw as being so prejudicial to Arab unity and giving the Arab world away to the "imperialists" as Nuri Said did in Iraq. Abdul Nasser did this in two ways, he first went ahead with the formulation of an Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian Defensive agreement as an alternative to the Baghdad Pact and second through press and radio propaganda advocated an anti-imperialist and pro-Arab unity position that were obviously opposed the British and Glubb Pasha.

The Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian (ESS) pact was in fact a series of bilateral agreements signed between Egypt and the two other powers. As mentioned above Egypt and Saudi Arabia had much reason to work against British designs in the Middle East, especially when the Arab personification of the treaty was Iraqi Prime Minister Nuri Said who was seen by Arab nationalists as a British stooge among the Arabs. It also fulfilled Abdul Nasser's promise

204Ibid.

for an anti-imperialist and positive neutralist defense agreement to stand up to the Western dominated Baghdad Pact. In an interview in October of 1955, Abdul Nasser explained to Joubran Hayak editor of *Al Jarida* the purpose of the bilateral agreements, as reported by Sir Humphrey Trevelyan the British Ambassador in Cairo. Trevelyan explains,

> Nasser declared that the bilateral pacts, which were now being drawn up between the Arab States and in which the great powers could not interfere,would form both the keystone in the structure of Arab unity and the means whereby the Arab States could ensure their safety without relinquishing their independence, interests, or distinctive character. At Bandoeng Egypt had clearly recognised the right of every State to defend itself either individually or collectively and had stressed that joint defence should be decided by the countries actually concerned. If the great powers participated in any pact they would have the last word. The others would be mere instruments of their policies and would lose their personality. The new bilateral pacts would be a stronghold against the intrigues of the great powers, and would uphold the theory that the defence of any region should emanate entirely from the countries of that region, acting in their own interests. This was the only way of strength for the Arab countries, which had been intended to remain weak and to rely upon others for their own defence.[205]

Within the structure of the ESS Pact as a multilateral agreement, Egypt had more power of movement in trying to oppose British action in the Middle East. It was because of Egypt's relationship with Saudi Arabia and their "corrupt influence" which was supported by "immense oil revenues" could be used by Abdul Nasser to subsidize his anti-British policies.[206] Abdul Nasser aimed to use the ESS Pact as tool of his anti-imperialist policies and as a way to lure Jordan way from alignment with Britain and the pro-Western Arab and other Middle Eastern governments. Cairo Radio reported a story on Christmas Eve 1955 that the ESS pact nations had offered the Jordanian Charge d'Affaires in Syria an offer to replace the British subsidy of £10 million with money from the ESS Pact with the expectation that King Hussein would end the

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205 Foreign Office, Trevelyan to Foreign Office. Cairo 24 October 1955. FO 371/115525

206PRO. 43rd Conclusions, 24 November 1955. London. CAB 128/29

Anglo-Jordanian treaty and remove all of the British officers from the Arab Legion.[207] The Egyptian Syrian Saudi pact proposed to replace Jordan's annual subsidy provided by the British government with their own subsidy (and all that implied). Another major piece of Egyptian policy in Jordan was characterized by the use of radio and newspaper propaganda by Cairo to turn public opinion against the British and the Baghdad Pact.

Glubb Pasha in his laconic soldierly style said that the Egyptians and Saudis were working to "prevent Jordan from joining the Baghdad Pact" and they attempted to do this by the use of radio and press propaganda. Radio Cairo's "Voice of the Arabs" which according to Glubb "poured forth a stream of propaganda, incitement and abuse." Glubb claimed that the propaganda line was that Jordan's accession to the Baghdad Pact would be followed by Israel joining thus making Jordan and Israel allies and precluding "any chance of border adjustment or of a solution to the refugee problem."[208] King Hussein also recounted the propaganda put on the airwaves by *Sawt al-Arab* in the winter of 1955-56. The radio screamed slogans "Hussein is selling out to the British!" and also roared "Egypt is the only really independent Arab country-thanks to Nasser!"[209] More generally, Cairo Radio's "Voice of the Arabs" (*Sawt al Arab)* was a propaganda program sponsored by Abdul Nasser that focused on an anti-imperialist and Arab nationalist view of the world. It carried through the airwaves many slogans similar to the ones above decrying Western imperialism and advocating Arab unity and strength. Sawt *al-Arab* aired positions such as "the enemies, O Arabs, are Britain because she deprives us of livelihood,

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207Foreign Office, From Mr. Duke to Foreign Office, Amman 24 December 1955. FO 371/115532

208Glubb, John Bagot. 1957. *A soldier with the Arabs*. New York: Harper p.394

209Hussein. 1962. *Uneasy lies the head; the autobiography of His Majesty King Hussein I of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan*. [New York]: B. Geis Associates; distributed by Random House. p.110

France because she is spilling our blood and the US because she wants for us enslavement. O Arabs, the enemy is any Eastern or Western state which wants for us enslavement, tyranny and exploitation." The program also called upon Arabs from Morocco to Iraq to rise up "everywhere destroying and sabotaging bases, fortifications and property of the enemy."[210] What was important is that these messages carried weight to the Arab public at large and their dissemination did much to help the goal of supporting the actors that were fighting throughout the Arab world to liberate Arabs from Western imperialism.

Also important was the weight carried by newspapers which according to Glubb Pasha arrived from Egypt nightly by air transport.[211] Egyptian newspapers such as *Akhbar al Yom, al-Ahram* and *Gomhouria* carried very anti-British and pro-Nasser headlines. Case in point was an article written by Anwar al-Sadat in the Egyptian daily *Gomhouria* under the banner headline "Anwar Sadat unveils Imperialist plot in Middle East." Again, Humphrey Trevelyan reported from Cairo his reading of the article as follows.

> *Gomhouria* published article by Sadat describing "desperate British plot", extending from Turkey to Persian Gulf, to destroy Arab spirit by isolating Arab people from each before being subjugated by British. Events in Jordan were part of this plot. Sadat had discovered in Lebanon that British propaganda had managed to convince Lebanese that British were about to take revenge on Syria.[212]

The newspaper also praised Nasser's offer aid to Jordan and King Hussein, a "new dawn" in Arab world in face of imperialist plots. *Al-Ahram* accused Britain of not abiding by the British, French, American Tripartite agreement by only selling arms to Israel and not Arab countries.[213]

210Anderson, Nationalist Voices, p.129

211Glubb, p.394

212Foreign Office, From Cairo to Foreign Office. 24 December 1955. FO 371/115534

213Ibid.

Propaganda's purpose is to inform mass audiences of a point of view that is amenable to your own and opposes some other point of view. Abdul Nasser's use of newspapers and radio for propaganda in the mid-1950s was very important in helping Abdul Nasser's supporters throughout the Arab world in this case Jordan. The parties of the JNM and the Jordanian Free Officers organized around the messages coming from Cairo and the overall socioeconomic and political climate of the Middle East during the 1950s. It was a time of revolution and challenging the status quo Jordan much like Egypt four years earlier made huge moves to rid itself of British domination. They did so by never acceding to the Baghdad pact, in March of 1956 King Hussein fired Glubb Pasha and all of the Arab Legion's British Officers. Then Jordan undertook a massive Arabization if its military and made it stronger in the face of the Israeli threat. King Hussein was never deposed like Farouk in Egypt or his cousin Faisal II in Iraq. The experience of Jordan's exposure to the talk of anti-imperialism and Arab Unity made King Hussein and the Hashemite Kingdom a state not fully on the side of the West and not entirely against Abdul Nasser and his goals.

Conclusion

The Egyptian role in challenging what Dulles and the State Department thought of as an "indigenous" defense pact was marked by his insistence on ideological consistency which shocked many Western observers in Egypt at the time. Abdul Nasser's belief in anti-imperialism, neutralism and Arab unity guided Egyptian foreign policy during the winter of 1955-56. He stressed this repeatedly when dealing with the representatives of Western governments on diplomatic mission in Cairo. Cairo's opposition to Iraq's status as the founding member of the Baghdad Pact made Abdul Nasser angry on two levels first because of his personal dislike for

Nuri Said. Second, because Iraq took Egypt's position away as the leader of Arab world. Abdul Nasser stressed this position of opposition to the Baghdad Pact also relating it to Britain's accession to the treaty, making it truly unacceptable, as Abdul Nasser was committed to his Anglophobe and anti-imperialist position. One way this was expressed was by the signing of the Egyptian-Syrian-Saudi Arabian Pact a step forward in Arab unity if only nominally to frustrate what Abdul Nasser saw as Iraqi and British schemes against Arab unity and a new insertion of British imperialism into the region.

Jordanian domestic politics also was ripe for a revolt against the old order, namely the British domination imposed by the presence of John Glubb Pasha and his Arab Legion in Jordan. Jordanian nationalists rallied around the parties of the Jordanian National Movement while in the army soldiers concerned with anti-imperialist nationalism had their own outlet in the form of the Jordanian Free Officers Movement. All of these actors were "*effendis"* and opposed British involvement in Jordan and they organized themselves into parties and groups that were oppositional to the hegemonic regime. Jordanian *"effendis"* formed a self-aware and mobilized civil society and organized itself into counterhegemonic political parties determined to fight a power of position against the Hashemite bases of power the Arab Legion, the Bedouin tribesmen and British financial support. Although civil society succeeded in ending the career of John Glubb and the British control of the Jordanian Army, it ultimately did not fully succeed as the Hashemite monarchy was never overthrown leaving Jordan in a state of passive revolution.214

214Cox, Civil Society, p.16.

Passive revolution has a variety of meanings in Gramsci's thought. It represents an abortive or incomplete transformation of society and can take various forms. One is change induced in a society by an external force that attracts internal support from some elements but does not overcome the opposition of other entrenched forces. This can lead to an ambivalent situation of 'revolution/restoration' where neither of the opposed bodies of forces is victorious over the other. Passive revolu tion can also take the form of a stalled war of position strategy

The Hashemite state was able to co-opt parties in opposition to it and place them in power as was the case of King Hussein's alliance with the young nationalist officers and Sulayman al-Nabulsi and the National Socialist Party being allowed to form a progressive nationalist government. The civilian parties did this by recruiting secondary school students to be the vanguards of their parties, while young Arab officer's organized meetings and lectures. The latter often ran afoul of Glubb Pasha's wishes for his Bedouin dominated Arab legion and many young capable Arab officers were fired because of their politics.

In short, the international situation, led by Abdul Nasser's wish to go against British imperialism in the region by opposing the Baghdad Pac was followed by his proposal of the ESS pact as a neutralist option. Egypt's foreign policy goals aligned perfectly with the domestic politics in Jordan and their wish to stand up for their political rights and national sovereignty coincided perfectly. Encouraged by the anti-imperialist fervor coming from Cairo, regular Jordanian citizens revolted against British imperialism and succeeded in getting rid of British influence. In March of 1956, King Hussein dismissed Glubb Pasha and all other British officers from the Arab legion. Jordan would soon be a country more closely aligned to Egypt than to Iraq and Britain, for the better part of a year. Jordan was free of Glubb and not in the Baghdad pact while British prestige was hurt by this episode. Nationalist elements would be emboldened by these events especially, July 1958, Iraq which leads us to the next chapter.

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which is strong enough to provoke opposition but not strong enough to overcome it. Furthermore, a strategy on the part of the dominant power gradually to coopt elements of the opposition forces?a strategy known in Italian politics as trasformismo – is another form of passive revolution. Yet another form would be emancipatory strategies divorced from the material conditions of the social groups involved, inevitably incurring the illusions of utopianism and idealism. Gramsci cited Tolstoyism and Gandhism in this regard.

CHAPTER 5: IRAQ UNDER THE HASHEMITES-1921-1958

OIL IMPERIALISM, LAND TENURE AND THE PROGRESSIVE ARAB NATIONALIST "*EFFENDIYYA*"

Egypt under Prime Minister Gamal Abdul Nasser's leadership was the vanguard of the Arab world, concluding a process in Egypt that had started in 1882 with Arabi Pasha's revolution against British occupation. Abdul Nasser's regime succeeded in concluding the evacuation of British military forces from the Suez Canal Zone and from Egyptian territory in 1954, ending an occupation that started in 1882. The July 25th 1952 revolution also ended the stranglehold of a British backed monarchy over an Arab state. The coup led to King Farouk living out the rest of his days in exile.

Jordan's Arab nationalists took Egypt's lead in opposing British informal colonial control of their country. Jordanian nationalists opposed the extension of neo-imperialist control over Arab lands that accession to the Baghdad Pact wished by the British government would ultimately lead to. Jordanian nationalists especially the king himself and the Jordanian Free Officers opposed the presence of General John Glubb and the British officered Arab Legion that minimized opportunities for advancement by Jordanian Arab officers in Jordan's army. The Jordanian nationalist parties were more opposed to British imperialism than to King Hussein who seemed empathetic to their aims. The Jordanian nationalist movement was supported by the power of Saudi and Egyptian money and propaganda leading to Jordan's more pro-Egyptian and neutralist alignment through 1956 and early 1957. Political and military opposition to British imperialism expressed itself in positive neutralism and a desire for Arab unity. But another major

pillar of Arab nationalism as supported by Abdul Nasser was an emphasis on socioeconomic reform, improving the life of Arab peasants and a belief in social justice.

Abdul Nasser's regime also undertook a major program of modernization, development and of improving the living conditions of Egypt's peasants. The Egyptian government did this by sponsoring industrial projects and development projects such as the Aswan High Dam. The Egyptian government also passed a land reform law that was discussed in the second chapter. Agrarian reform legislation was aimed to break the power of a country's elite and to end "feudalism," in progressive Arab nationalist terms.

Iraq had socioeconomic conditions similar to Egypt's in their respective monarchic and pre-revolutionary periods. With a small landed class of "feudal" lords that controlled the majority of cultivated land in the countryside. A mass of poor small holders that held a large portion of the country's agricultural land but were doomed to poverty, because of the quality of their land and the inefficiency of cultivating small plots of land along with other issues such as indebtedness and deplorable living conditions. The majority of the Iraqi rural population were *fellahin* or landless peasants and sharecroppers who had much in common with the above mentioned class of small holders in their socioeconomic situation.

The revolution of 1958 aimed to make things better for Iraq's small holders and *fellahin.* It planned to do so by following Abdul Nasser's example of supporting progressive land reform to break the power of the feudal landlords and to give a new start to Iraq's small holders and *fellahin.* The Qasim government also supported other legislation to improve the lives of the Iraqi workers and agricultural masses.

The Socioeconomic Bases of Power in Hashemite Iraq.

Much like in the previous chapter, where the (Trans)Jordanian state was defined by the British's and Abdullah's need to consolidate power for a foreign and artificial dynastic construct. One method to support this foreign construct was to have its power base vested upon them by the British in the form of the Glubb's Arab Legion along with its financial subsidy. The Arab Legion though a thoroughly British institution drew its local forces not from Jordan's agricultural and urban sectors of the population but from its nomadic tribal population. The amalgam of the British supported Arab Legion and Jordan's Bedouins was the base of support for which the Hashemite dynasty drew its legitimacy during Abdullah's and Talal's reign. It is important to keep this situation in mind as the issue of socioeconomic and hegemonic power in the more powerful Hashemite state is explored.

Iraq was created by the British out of the three Ottoman vilayets, Mosul in the north, and Baghdad in the center and Basrah in the south. But the basis of power for the Iraqi Hashemite state was based on "a spirit inherently antithetical to" the British interests.[215] The Iraqi state in the period 1921-1939 driven by both administrative needs and in order to cultivate national sentiment focused on a pan-Arab universalistic conception of the state. The Hashemite state aimed to do this by focusing on expanding the state's educational capacity, under the leadership of Sati al-Husri as the Minister of Education as mentioned in the historiography. The state's emphasis on education led to the creation of a "a new middle class intelligentsia, the natural

215Batatu, Old Social Classes, p.25

carriers of national sentiment."[216] More on the role of Iraq's middle class later.

Faisal I's successors Ghazi, and 'Abd al-Ilah acting as a regent to the young Faisal II aimed to use the army as a way to consolidate the dynasty's power up to the military coup of 1941. Faisal I, considered the army "the spinal column for nation forming," and royal policy reflected this.[217] In 1933, Faisal I increased the army from 7,500 men to 11,500 men, by 1936 under Ghazi there were 800 officers and almost 20,000 men in Iraq's army. Three years later there were 600 more officers and 6000 more men in the army; in the corresponding period Iraq also built up its air forces going from a small number of pilots in 1933 to more than 150 by 1937.[218] The Hashemite state used the army as the main instrument of its centralizing policies, which aimed to make Iraq into a single national unit from 1921-1936.

The role of the army as a guarantor of dynastic power diminished in the period after 1936 until the end of the monarchy in 1958. The young army officers were an opposition movement that represented the "armed segment of the middle class" that, through a series of coups, broke the monopoly of power held up to then in Iraq by "the English, the king, the principal ex-Sharifian officers, and the upper stratum of the propertied classes."[219] The success of these coups were attributed to:

> sentiments or manifested tendencies – reformism, or pan-Arabism, or neutralism or intense opposition to English influence, or sheer discontent at the exclusion of all but a few from any effective role in the political life of the country – sentiments and tendencies that were shared by a substantial portion of the officer corps and of the middle class

216Ibid. p.25

217Ibid. p.26

218Ibid p.27

219 Ibid. pp.28-29

from which the corps largely stemmed.[220]

There were three major trends that manifested themselves amongst the army's officers, a Kurdish element, a pan-Arab element and a Iraqi element. Kurdish and Iraqi nationalists led the coup of 1936 while pan-Arab nationalists led the 1941 coup.[221] the prevalence of pan-Arabism among Iraq's officers could be attributed to the fact that many of the officers hailed from regions that were economically linked to Syria and Palestine during the Ottoman period along with the state's "own initial pan-Arab predilection." that was expressed in these officers' formative years in the Iraqi public education system.[222] The army's oppositional role led the Hashemite state to reverse its policy goals in the years between 1941 and 1948. The army had forced more than 1,400 of its own officers into early retirement and had left the Iraqi army in a state of disrepair.[223] In the period after the 1941 coup the monarchy having lost the loyalty of the army and the urban middle classes realigned itself with another sector of Iraqi society, the tribal shaikhs.

One of the major consequences of the army's and the urban population's opposition to the monarchy was that the institution that Faisal I had called the "spinal column for nation forming" was now against the concept of an Iraqi Hashemite state. During Faisal I's and Ghazi's reigns as mentioned above the state's centralizing tendencies meant that it was a force for integration. The tribal shaikhs represented the ideal of tribal traditions and of multiple communities. The power in Baghdad and the tribal shaikhs were at odds with each other's' goals for the direction of social and political developments in Iraq, which led to Faisal I often supporting the goals of nationalists

220Ibid, p.29

221Ibid.

222Ibid.

223Batatu, p.30

that were in opposition to those of the tribal shaikhs.[224] The period of the second British occupation (1941-1946) and of the end of Abd il-ilah's regency and Faisal II's reign (1946-1958) was defined by cooperation between the state and the tribal leadership.

I want to outline briefly some of the factors that accounted for the rise of cooperation between the monarchy and the tribal shaikhs in the period following the end of the second British occupation until the end of the monarchy. The monarchy replaced the urban and nationalist core of support in the political process by replacing them with men from the "shaikhly" stratum of society. Although Iraq always maintained a pretense of free elections, the process was so corrupt that one may speak of the "appointment" of shaikhs to parliament. During Faisal I's reign the highest number of tribal shaikhs in parliament was 18 or 20.5 percent in 1933. By 1958 under Faisal II the percentage of seats in the chamber of deputies who were tribal shaikhs was 35.9 percent.[225] The crown also attempted to co-opt the tribal leadership by giving them positions within the executive branch with an average of 1.8 percent during the reign of Faisal I to 6 percent in the period 1947-1958. Another major development was the membership of many tribal shaikhs in the "Higher Directorate" of Nuri Said's Constitutional Union Party, comprising seventeen of its forty-six members.[226] The Hashemites aligned themselves with the tribal shaikhs to counterbalance against the army's increased sociopolitical power that coincided with the creation of a new middle class of secondary school and university educated leftist, nationalist intelligentsia and political activists. This again fits well within Robert Cox's conception of civil

224Batatu, p.27, p.102

225Ibid. pp.102-103

226Ibid pp.103-104

society as a mobilized and participatory social group opposed to the hegemonic blocco storico.[227] As early as 1936, nationalist Iraqi army officers had been playing the role of a mobilized citizenry fighting a long war of position against the hegemonic classes, namely the monarchy, the high level politicians and British institutions and its functionaries. This new political alignment between te Hashemites and Iraq's tribal lords had an ever larger effect in Iraq's socioeconomic agrarian scene which placed an even larger burden on Iraq's *fellahin*.

Land Tenure and Politics in Hashemite Iraq-1932-1958
The Partnership Between the State and the Tribal Shaikhs.

The alliance between the Hashemite state and the tribal shaikhs was one of the most defining relationships in Iraqi history in the period after the first decade of the monarchy. As mentioned above the break between the dynasty and the army and the sectors of population it represented, namely the new middle classes and the urban nationalists. This forced the state to find a new source of legitimacy in the tribal shaikhly class and with this alliance the dynasty "ceased in effect," in Batatu's words "to play a unifying social role." [228] The most significant role played by the Hashemite state was strengthening the power of the tribal shaikhs over Iraq's land and its *fellahin.*

A series of laws in the period after 1932 redefined the relationship between the state, the tribal shaikhs and Iraq's peasants. These laws created a new type of land tenure called *lazmah.* *Lazmah* was a new form of land tenure that existed along with *tapu* a form of tenure from the

227Cox, Civil Society, p.6

228Ibid, p.32

Ottoman era, these two systems were types of *miri* or state land that were rented out by the state to large landowners.[229] But what distinguished *lazmah* from *tapu* was that "*tapu* rights were acquired on the strength of ten years of prescriptive use of the land." Whereas the claim to *lazmah* land was based upon "a 'productive use' of the land *within* the fifteen years preceding the declaration of land settlement in the particular district was enough to form the basis of *lazmah* grants."[230] This effectively allowed for tribal leaders to incorporate land into their *lazmah* grant that as recently as the year before had not yet been cultivated.

The new *lazmah* land tenure legislation was in effect nothing more than a confirmation by the state of a process that had been going on in the Iraqi countryside, "the usurpation by the shaikhs and aghas of the communal tribal domain, their dispossession of weaker neighbors, and their encroachment on virgin state land."[231] The most extreme example of this practice was that of the shaikh Muhan al-Khairullah of the Shuweilat tribe. In 1919, this shaikh's tribe cultivated a parcel of about sixty square miles or 60,000 donums[232,] thirty years later this shaikh had "laid his hands on" more than one million donums of land in Qal'at Sikar near the Euphrates river. The new *lazmah* land tenure system, along with processes that had been going on in Iraq's countryside that equated the ownership with tribal prestige, ultimately led to the agrarian situation in Iraq to be as unequal as it was on the eve of the revolution. A short survey of the land situation in Iraq on the eve of the revolution made obvious how unequal the situation had become. In a country of 6.5 million people there were only 250,000 landholders, seventy-two

229Ibid, p.109

230Ibid.

231Ibid p.110

232A donum is equivalent to about .6 acres of land.

percent of the land was held as either *tapu* or *lazmah* tenure, with only .8 percent being held in traditional landownership. One percent of the landowners controlled more than fifty-five percent of the land in Iraq; while seventy-three percent of landowners owned less than fifty donums of lands or less making up six percent of the total area. Eighty percent of Iraqi families owned no land at all. Hanna Batatu compiled a list of the major families owning more than 30,000 donums of land in the Iraqi countryside of forty-nine families twenty-two of them are tribal shaikhs comprising about forty-five percent of the population of large landowners and holding fifty-one percent of the land in this group or more than 2.7 million donums of land. [233]

It is plain to see that the great concentration of land under a few families was a policy that was supported by the apparatus of the Iraqi Hashemite state, especially in the period after Faisal's reign culminating in Abd il-Ilah's regency for the young Faisal II. The monarchy having lost its support from the army and nationalists, especially the pan-Arabists it pivoted away from the city and towards the countryside. This new partnership ultimately led to the co-option of the tribal shaikhs into Iraqi politics and further entrenched their position of paramountcy in the countryside. This was done by legalizing processes that were part of normal tribe life such as the usurpation of land by shaikhs to strengthen their own social (tribal) and economic positions. The *lazmah* statutes created an environment that made the state complicit in the concentration of quasi-state land in the hands of very few people and the attendant harm it caused Iraq's lower agrarian classes.

233Ibid, pp. 110-111.

British Oil Imperialism in Iraq
The Hashemites and the Iraqi Petroleum Company

Equally important were the external forces which supported the Hashemite dynasty, namely the British. It is impossible to ignore the topic of oil as the reason for British involvement in Iraq. Oil was the *raison d'etre* for British involvement in Iraq particularly and also the Persian Gulf region both in the interwar period and after the World War II. British informal imperialism regardless of the interpretative slant taken, either the more orthodox view taken by professors Gallagher and Robinson or the more critical and thorough view of Hopkins' and Cain's "gentlemanly capitalism," was reality. The British empire had abiding spheres of economic and political influence all over the world in the long period of British imperial decline. One of the most vigorous cases of British informal imperialism was Iraq and the Iraq Petroleum Company concession.

As was mentioned in the introduction, it is fruitful to think of the British Empire in the Middle East as more of an "empire" than a full -fledged imperium in the sense of traditional colonialism, as in the Iberian experience in the New World. In the period succeeding World War I, the British established relationships throughout the Middle East and the Arab World proper that sought to strengthen their economic and political imperial interests. This project of assuring influence ranged from securing the Palestinian and Mesopotamian mandates from the League of Nations, to a series of bilateral treaties signed between Britain and Arab monarchies friendly to the British cause, especially the three discussed in these pages. Egypt, (Trans)Jordan and Iraq. The Suez Canal Zone, Jordan's Arab Legion and the status of Anglo-Iraqi defense relationship were the key agreements in Britain's imperial goals in the Arab world. The Anglo-Iraqi

relationship as the Hashemite era reached its end became even stronger with the signing of the Baghdad Pact and the renegotiation of the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930. These military/political agreements were important in spurring anti-British Arab nationalist feelings in the Anglo-Arab world.

But concessionary imperialism extended beyond the granting of transit, assistance and base rights. The other major case of concessionary imperialism as such was the relationship between the British government and the Iraqi Petroleum Company. Hopkins and Cain cite imperialism as being the "incursion or attempted incursion, into the sovereignty of another state."[234] An oil concession is nothing if not an imperialist institution one state or its private agents thereof attempt to gain access to another state's territory or resources.

The Iraq hat was founded as the League of Nations mandate for Mesopotamia was key to British imperial goals after the World War One. Iraq's importance was twofold. It was a mainline of communication between the British Isles and its possessions in India, Singapore and Australia, but more importantly, security was necessary in the Mesopotamia because of concerns of the extraction of Iraqi oil. Winston Churchill in his capacity as Colonial Secretary formulated the idea of creating the Iraqi Mandate (with Faisal I as king) as a way to assure the Gulf region's defense with the minimal expense to the British taxpayer.[235]

The Iraqi Petroleum Company (IPC) on March 14 1925 signed a seventy-five year-long concession with the Iraqi government that ceded to the IPC the rights to drill in Mosul, Baghdad and later Basrah vilayets. The IPC's concept was put together by the Armenian businessman

234Supra, footnote 46

235Yergin, Daniel. 1991. *The prize: the epic quest for oil, money, and power*. New York: Simon & Schuster. p.201

Calouste Gulbenkian who said of himself "I classify myself as a business architect. I design this company and that company. I designed this Turkish Petroleum Company and I made room for Deterding and I made room for the French and I made room for you." This would ultimately be the make-up of the IPC. With 23.75% going to Royal Dutch Shell, the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the Compagnie Française de Pétroles and Near East Development Company an American conglomerate of Standard Oil of New Jersey (Esso) and Socony Vacuum (Mobil) with Gulbenkian himself receiving 5% of the oil with the option to sell his share of oil to the CFP.[236]

In return for the concession, the IPC paid the Iraqi government £400,000 a year between 1925 and 1931. From 1931 to 1950, IPC paid four shillings of gold per ton of oil produced and from August of 1950 to February of 1952 six shillings per ton. After 1952, the concession was renegotiated to a profit-sharing agreement with the Iraqi government receiving 12.5% of the price of every barrel of oil sold.[237] It is important to note that in the last eight years of the monarchy oil production by the IPC increased by more than fourfold and the revenue increased sixteen-fold, the former from 8.6 tons in 1950 to 35.8 tons in 1958 while the latter increased from 5.3 million dinars to 79.9 million dinar in the respective years.[238]

In 1950, the Iraqi government initiated the program for development under the auspices of the Iraqi Development Board (IBD) which aimed to use oil revenues to improve Iraq's economy and especially the agrarian sector. But the problem of concentration of land in the

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236Brenchley, Frank. 1989. *Britain and the Middle East: an economic history, 1945-87*. London: L. Crook Academic Pub. pp. 19, 104-105. Yergin, Prize pp.203-204

237Saul, Samir. 2007. "Masterly Inactivity as Brinkmanship: The Iraq Petroleum Company's Route to Nationalization, 1958-1972". *The International History Review.* 29 (4): 746-792. pp.746-747.

238Farouk-Sluglett, Marion, and Peter Sluglett. 1987. *Iraq since 1958: from revolution to dictatorship*. London: KPI. p.42

hands of a few landowners made any of the IBD's plans moot in improving the lot of Iraqi peasants. The major thrust of agricultural development was "the building of a series of dams for the storage of water during the flood seasons and its subsequent use for summer irrigation. These blueprints represented the culmination of the engineer's approach. The people of Iraq did not have a say "except insofar as they provided labor," the problem was compounded by "bringing new land under cultivation before improving the system of land already under cultivation was unjustifiable since it left the system of exploitation and agricultural backwardness intact."[239] The relationship between the Hashemite state, the large landowners, particularly the tribal shaikhs and the IPC created a situation where oil wealth was ill distributed and only worked to make Iraq's elite richer. Meanwhile the mass of landless peasants lived a hard life of near feudal subservience with no hope for improvement.

The Socioeconomic Status of Iraq's *Fellahin.*

Hanna Batatu's thorough study of Iraq's classes during the monarchy has been an invaluable source in doing this paper. Interactions between the state and civil society especially after 1936 until the end of the monarchy were very instructive in studying a topic as complex as socioeconomic power relations. It is not incidental that in the years after 1936 the distribution of land became so concentrated in the hands of the families of a few tribal shaikhs. The elevation of the status of the tribal shaikhs resulted in the depression of the living conditions of Iraq's *fellahin* that during the monarchy was one of deprivation, sickness, indebtedness and insecurity.

239 Alnasrawi, Abbas. 1994. *The economy of Iraq: oil, wars, destruction of development and prospects, 1950-2010*. Westport, Conn: Greenwood Press. p.26

The most common of Iraq's peasants was the sharecropper who lived in Iraq's river valleys and their situation was one of extreme poverty. These sharecroppers "formed the backbone of the country, but they labored without living." These peasants lived in "overcrowded mud or mat huts together with their cows or buffaloes, surrounded by refuse." Their only luxury was a bit of tea and sugar they subsisted on a diet of dates, lentils along with barley or rice making it into a "sort of bread exceedingly unpalatable."[240] In many cases Iraqi peasants were in such a miserable situation because of the dues and shares of produce they owed to their landlords. With some peasants only being able to retain one-quarter of his rice harvest in the river valleys while Kurdish migrant farmers in the more arid north often took less than twenty percent of their own crop or only cash payments. The practice of unequal sharecropping along with other practices of landlords taking miscellaneous dues from their tenants added to the Iraqi peasants misery and to their personal debt.[241] Although the economic and living situation for Iraq's peasants was poor, their health was much worse, as this quote from an Iraqi doctor shows:

> "A patient, is admitted to the hospital. At a glance you realize he is suffering from ankylostomiasis (hook worm) and stool examination confirms that. You are struck with the extreme degree of his anemia and the obvious state of starvation. On diet and oral iron alone his condition improves and in one month his Hb (hemoglobin) goes up to 50% and R.B.C (red blood cells) to 3 million per c.c. He is given anti-ankylostoma treatment, his previous condition not permitting this. He feels much better and a marked improvement is noted in his mental powers. He wants to go home, back to his work and you have to let him go back to the same environment. A year later he is readmitted in the same condition.[242]

240Batatu, p.140

241Ibid, pp. 142-143

242Ibid, p.141

The facts of structural poverty, horrid living conditions, debt that led to bad health was a reality that couldn't be ignored in Iraq during the monarchy. As mentioned earlier the army, the urban population and the new middle class had asserted itself in Iraqi politics for the first time starting in 1936. It is plain to see that the uneducated, abject masses of Iraq's peasants could not stand up for their own rights but Iraq's own Free Officers could be a movement for progress to break the grip of "feudalism" on the Iraqi countryside.

The Socioeconomic Factor Leading to the 1958 Revolution. The Rise of the Urban Middle Class and the Free Officers.

The living conditions and the socioeconomic state of Iraq's fellahin meant that they could not stand up for their own rights which meant that Iraq's mobilized *"effendiyya"* would have to be the group to affect change in Iraqi society. Taking off from Gramsci in the Southern Question the question of the relationship between Iraqi peasants and petty bourgeoisie were similar to the one described by Gramsci in the Southern Question,

> The Southern peasants are in perpetual ferment, but as a mass they are incapable of giving a centralized expression to their aspirations and needs. The middle layer of intellectuals receives the impulses for its political and ideological activity from the peasant base.[243]

Meaning that although the peasantry was dissatisfied with their own socioeconomic conditions they could not organize themselves and become a counterhegemonic group in the same way that the well-educated petty bourgeoisie intellectual could. In the Iraqi case the progressive Arab nationalist *"effendis"* became the main advocates for the landless, ignorant and impoverished

243Gramsci, *Selections from political writings* . p.454

fellahin suffering under "feudalism." The Iraqi government from the earliest days of Faisal I had emphasized pan-Arabism as a key ideological precept aimed at unifying Iraq's diverse groups and above all the Sunni-Shi'a split that was and still remains a major issue in Iraqi politics and society. The increase in urbanization and especially the importance of Baghdad in Iraq's sociopolitical milieu was an important factor that led to the rise of the middle class as a viable oppositional group.

The Hashemite state personified by the person of Sati al-Husri had emphasized the importance of education for the creation of a unified Iraqi state. Pan-Arab ideology was taught at the schools and was greatly influential on the students that graduated from secondary school and university. Iraqi "*effendis,"* especially the army officers, were a fervently nationalist group and they expressed this nationalism in support for "the phenomenon of leftist-revolutionary nationalist radicalism."[244] This could be explained by the simple fact that policies sponsored by the Hashemite state created a class that "was hostile to what was above it, but affirmatively uncommitted, and with unsatisfied needs and unverbalized demands, and with ranks ripe for organization." [245] This trend of increased radicalization and the creation of the potential for a politically mobilized middle class was spurred by that the fact between 1927 and 1958 secondary and university students in Iraq increased from 2,000 in the former to 135,658 in the latter with forty-five percent of those students living in Baghdad at the time of the revolution.[246]

Accompanying to this trend of greater educational opportunities in Iraq was the

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244Eppel, Michael. 1998. "The elite, the 'effendiyya', and the growth of nationalism and pan-Arabism in Hashemite Iraq, 1921-1958". *International Journal of Middle East Studies.* 30 (2): 227-250. p.246

245Batatu, p.478

246Ibid, p.481

increasing size of the "state apparatus" and the employment of these students within the civil service, the educational system and the military, with the number of government employees growing from about 3,000 in 1920 to more than 23,000 in 1958.[247] The Hashemite nation-building exercise was in practice a closed feedback loop, which perpetuated trends that were inimical to the government's sociopolitical position of hegemonic power. The more young men graduated from secondary schools and universities the more jobs the government had to provide to keep this new larger sector of the population satisfied. One way the Iraqi government did this was by expanding the size of the state and in particular the educational system. The well-educated Iraqi middle class men were the main disseminators of the concepts that they had learned while in school. Ironically the Hashemite state's policy of school expansion created a small educated and literate class which allowed for the dissemination of nationalist ideas through the printed word. In the second half of the 1930s, the radio became a viable way to express Western political ideas and disseminate propaganda to the larger illiterate population. [248] The significance of Arab nationalism, the increase in school attendance, the creation of a new literate class (an intelligentsia) and the importance of the mass media were factors that greatly influenced Iraqi politics during the monarchy and this is demonstrated by the rise of a Free Officers movement in the Iraqi army.

The Free Officers Movement and Progressive Modernization among the Iraqi "*Effendiyya"*

The larger trend of the rise of the middle class in Iraq during the Hashemite period had its

247Eppel, p.237 Batatu, p.33

248Eppel, p.237

analog in one of the modern states' defining institutions, the army. The Free Officers movement represented the larger features of Iraqi society in microcosm. Of the fourteen officers that made up the Central Organization of the Free Officers' all of them had gone to state secondary schools and the Military College, in the process they all had received the pan-Arabist tinged education typical of Hashemite Iraq.[249] Some of the officers advanced further in their educations either receiving law degrees or enrolling in the Staff College. All except three of the men had been born in Baghdad and General Abd al-Karim Qasim was the only general while all of the other men were either Colonels or Majors born in between the World Wars. Much like their civilian counterparts the officers could be considered a "modernizing class, the new generation, both intellectuals and professionals, had displayed a passionate desire for development along one ideological line or another and was to resist the monopoly of power by the ruling oligarchy."[250] Iraq's westernized *effendiyya,* either civilian or military, recognized that the only method by which social reform would ever happen without what Antonio Gramsci would call a war of position in which "social revolution is achieved, if the revolutionary change is ever to be meaningful. Not until the social structure of society has undergone such a complete change can we expect the new elite to play its role in society without resort to violence."[251] Hegemonic classes fashion the state in their own image, Hashemite Iraq was defined as mentioned above by the cooperation between the dynasty and the tribal shaikhs, any effort to change society would have to break this partnership to refashion the state in a new more just image.

249Khadduri, Majid. 1969. *Republican 'Iraq: a study in 'Iraqi politics since the revolution of 1958*. London: Oxford University Press. p.18

250Khadduri, p.7

251Ibid, p.10

The Free Officers as a vanguard group of well-educated, nationalist, socially conscious reformers demonstrated the spirit sweeping across the Arab world during the 1950s. When the population of Arab countries that were born after World War One were suffused with the ideals of Arab nationalism and social justice, they were coming to power for the first time and changing the shape of the relationship between the state and society.

The July 14 Revolution, Development and Land Reform

The relationship between state and society in Iraq was meager and a sometimes non-existent. The Hashemite state had its connections within Iraq to a very small portion of the population. Their internal power base was mainly the large landowners especially the tribal shaikhs but other groups such as the merchants played a significant role. More important were the politicians connected to Faisal I and the Hashemite dynasty through their involvement in the Arab Revolt instigated by Faisal's father Sharif Hussein of the Hejaz against the Ottomans during the World War One. Many of these men became key parts of the Hashemite regime in Iraq with Nuri Said, Jafar al-Askari, Jamil al-Midfai and Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi reaching the premiership during the monarchy.[252] The domestic structure of the monarchy's power was held in the hands of the few, the landowners, the parliament, the cabinet level ministers, the commanders of the military and obviously the royal family itself. They shut out the masses of the Iraqi people from the political process, no matter the sect, ethnicity or class.

The Hashemite dynasty's dependence also stretched outwards from Iraq's border,

252Batatu, Old Social Classes, p.319

especially in its relationship with the IPC and its Anglo-French-American composition was an abiding factor of Western imperialism in Iraq. The British government emphasized Persian Gulf oil as key to its post-1945 development program especially as it was necessary to literally fuel reconstruction after World War II. Further, Persian Gulf oil helped in strengthening sterling and Britain's balance of payments situation, which was disastrous after World War II. Iraq's oil fit this description as it was "plentiful, cheap, and obtainable in sterling," and thus helped to strengthen sterling and Britain's "international prestige and influence."[253] The monarchy, the Iraqi landed elite and British imperial concerns were the most important factors girding power in Iraq and the main pillars of hegemonic power in Iraq.

The details of the coup d'etat are not important in themselves , all that is significant is that on July 14 1958 Iraq's Free Officers led a coup d'etat led by Brigadier General Abd al-Karim Qasim and Colonel Abdul Salam 'Aref.. In which after a few hours they took control of the important "nerve centers" such as the Broadcasting House, the Palace, the Ministry of Defense and the headquarters of the Mobile Police Force. The Free Officers killed off the entire Iraqi branch of the Hashemite family including the king, the crown prince and the following day a crowd killed General Nuri Said trying to flee Baghdad dressed as a woman.[254] But more important than the politics, the petty rivalries and the complications of narrative history, were the stated aims of the revolution.

Keeping in mind the factors that had defined the relationship between the Iraqi state and its society during the monarchy especially the great divide between the rich and the poor, it is not

253Galpern, Steven G. 2009. *Money, oil, and empire in the Middle East: sterling and postwar imperialism, 1944-1971*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. p.283-284

254Dann, Uriel. 1969. *Iraq under Qassem; a political history, 1958-1963*. [New York]: Praeger. pp.29-30

shocking that the Free Officers put so much emphasis on social justice, modernization and development as the *raison d'être* for the revolution. Colonel 'Arif in an interview with Middle Eastern News Agency took a very populist tone in announcing the revolution's goals. 'Arif said "There is no doubt the great class differences among people were fed by the imperialist interests which acted to confirm them to cause dissension in the ranks of our nation and weaken it."[255] Prime Minister Qasim speaking to an Indian newspaper defined the revolution's goals:

> The main targets of the revolution are to liberate the country and form an independent and fully sovereign Republic in which no foreign country can interfere in its internal or external affairs; to step out of the element of corruption and exploitation and to allow the people to rule themselves by themselves and express their true opinion on the form they prefer.[256]

It is significant to note that Prime Minister Qasim in a speech, given on the occasion of the one month anniversary of the revolution. Said that the July 14 Revolution was a continuation of the many revolutions in Iraqi history that had attempted to liberate the people from governments "under the inspiration of the foreigner and the Devil" and that like the Egyptian revolution in 1952 it was a great victory for the Arab nation.[257] Arab nationalism was as much an emancipatory movement aimed at national "liberation" and "sovereignty" as it was for mere political independence.

The socioeconomic and political realities of the Arab world after World War II made a movement such as progressive Arab nationalism possible. Was a movement initiated by the new

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255Foreign Office Monitoring, Iraqi Deputy Premier's With MENA, July 27 1958, FO 371/134200

256Foreign Office, Fortnightly Report from Baghdad for 22 September to 7 October 1958, Baghdad FO 371/133070

257Foreign Office, Fortnightly Report From Baghdad for August 12-26, 1958, Baghdad, 26 August 1958, FO 371/133068

Arab middle class created by the exercise of nation-building starting in the 1920s. Progressive Arab nationalism had as its main goal the freedom of all Arabs no matter what their class. The opposition to broad concepts such as imperialism and feudalism can be interpreted as a rejection of all processes and institutions that dominate and exploit the Arab people. On the international level the British informal empire and its establishments, economic, political and military dominated the lives of Arab states. Imperialism in this sense has the connotation of privilege, when a party has preferential access to another party's resources, territory and institutions. Britain's imperialism in the Arab world was made possible by their alliance with the dynasties and social groups that would benefit from those partnerships. The Egyptian Khedives turned Kings and the thoroughly Hejazi Hashemites, installed as the rulers of two "fictional" states created by imperial fiat and made sacrosanct by the League of Nation's imprimatur to benefit French and British imperialism.

In turn, these dynasties created states in an image that would be first beneficiary to their interests and second salutary to British interests. From this was born the other form of privilege decried by Abdul Nasser and other Arab nationalists, feudalism. Men like Gamal Abdul Nasser, Ali Abu Nuwwar , Abd al-Karim Qasim, and Abdul Salam 'Arif were men born of modest means but by virtue of their education and professions had their lot elevated. These Free Officers, men who could have gone down the path of corruption, political intrigue and privilege chose not to. They chose another way to not to improve only their own situation but those of their less fortunate brothers. In Egypt this took the shape of land reform and the institution of a planned economy. In Jordan, the Hashemites and the person of Hussein were able to maintain power but only by remaining open to some of the concepts of Arab nationalism. Now the case of Iraq's response to "feudalism," underdevelopment and its implementation of social justice will be

explored.

Land Reform and Social Justice in Post-Revolutionary Iraq.

Hanna Batatu made a connection between the rise cost of living and its effect on both unskilled workers and civil servants including the army officers in Baghdad as one the reasons for popular uprisings of 1948, 1952 and 1956. Where there were noticeable spikes in the cost of living258 Thus one of the first actions taken by the government after July 14 was to implement price controls to help their main power base, the workers and professionals in the major cities especially Baghdad. The government implemented price controls of bread meat and gasoline, reduced the import duty on staples such as tea, sugar and coffee. Another major important piece of urban legislation was a law setting up rent controls for *sarifa*[259] dwellers.[260] These measures were important insofar as they stabilized the economic situation within Iraq and gave the revolutionary regime time to formulate policies aimed at improving the standard of living of all Iraqis.

A major concern to Qasim's government was land reform and the freeing of the mass Iraqi *fellahin* from "feudalism," the power of the tribal shaikhs and "poverty, ignorance and

258Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp.471-475

259A *sarifa* according to Batatu p.134 is a one room hut built of reeds and mats and covered with mud during the winter. They are like shanty towns in the sense of major urban agglomerations throughout developing countries like favelas in Brazil.

260Foreign Office, Establishment of Republican Government Completed Revolution? Baghdad, 9 September 1958, FO 371/133068.

disease," in the Nasserist formula.[261] Prime Minister Qasim also referred to land reform as "a revolution within a revolution...agrarian reform will ensure stability...we have increased the landholdings of the poor."[262] Social Justice was a main goal of the revolution and the specifics of the land reform law were established to make this a reality.

The main thrust of the land reform law was to redistribute Iraq's land from the large landowners to the disadvantaged *fellahin*. This was done by limiting the size of estates to 1000 donums in irrigated lands and twice that amount in rainfall fed land. The land would be redistributed to peasants in parcels of between 30 to 60 donums in irrigation fed areas and twice that in rainfall fed land.[263] The law provided for the remuneration of landowners for the lands seized from them, by issuing bonds. The process would take place within 5 years.[264]

Another major provision of the land reform law was the setting up of agricultural cooperatives The cooperatives functions were:

> (a) to obtain agriculture credits for their members; (b) to provide the farmers with seed, fertilizer, cattle, agricultural machinery, storage and transportation means, (c) to organize the cultivation and exploitation of land in the most efficient manner, including the selection of seed and grading , combating pests and digging canals and drains; (d) to market the principal crops on behalf of their members and to keep their accounts; and (e) to render all other agriculture and social services in the interests of their members.[265]

There were also provisions in the law settling the obligations of landowners and tenants and for

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261Foreign Office, Fortnightly Report from Baghdad for 22 September to 7 October 1958, Baghdad FO 371/133070

262Dann, Iraq under Qassem, p.64

263Gabbay, Rony. 1978. *Communism and agrarian reform in Iraq*. London: Croom Helm. p.109

264Ibid.

265Gabbay, p.110

the institution of a minimal wage, labor unions and collective bargaining for Iraqi peasants.[266] Such a large and complex project was expected to take a long time to complete and by 1971 the Iraq government undertook a census of agriculture and the picture of landownership looked entirely different from the numbers in 1958. According to the census there were 591,178 holdings amounting to to 22.9 million donums averaging 38.7 donums per capita. Eighty seven percent of the agricultural workforce owned their own land and almost 40% of land in Iraq was held by beneficiaries or leased from beneficiaries of the Land Reform Law of 1958.[267] Nasserism or Arab Socialism, unlike Marxism, never rejected the concept of private ownership of land, it only opposed feudalism, privilege and injustice. Qasim's Minister of Finance wrote this of the land reform plan:

> By endorsing private ownership, providing adequate compensation to landowners for land expropriated, allowing landlords to retain a portion of their property, and leaving the control of land use to the fallahin, our progressive agrarian reform programme engenders minimum economic and social disruption, gives fair treatment to all concerned, and most important of all, wins the support of the intended beneficiaries.[268]

On the simple standard of ending feudalism and the tight grip of the tribal shaikhs and large landowners on Iraq's land and its people the land reform was a success. What's more it gave hope to a people who up to then had no hope.

266Ibid, pp.110-111

267 Ibid., p.120

268Ibid, p.113

Conclusion

Iraq under the Hashemites was defined domestically by the alliance of the Hashemite dynasty, the tribal shaikhs and the political elites. This triumvirate was opposed after 1936 by the urban pan-Arab nationalist middle class that felt abused by the system of privilege, corruption and their poor living conditions. The great mass of the people of Iraq had no say. They were the uneducated and landless *fellahin* who labored in the massive plantations for no pay. The peasants as a group were poor, ignorant and generally sick, malnourished and exhausted. This socioeconomic construct defined Iraq during the Hashemite era.

Internationally Hashemite Iraq's closest ally was Britain who depended on it for oil and for imperial aerial communication. The relationship between the Iraqi state and the IPC was the essence of the Anglo-Iraqi relationship. The IPC was a manifestation of British informal imperialism in Iraq and by the way, of a concession the British government had gained a sphere of influence within Iraq. The IPC was a tool used as leverage to coerce decision-making by the Iraqi government. The Hashemite dynasty itself and its closest allies the Sharifian officers who composed the political elite, these men served in the Sharif Hussein's army of the Great Arab Revolt of World War I. This was the definition of hegemonic power held by the state at the dawn of July 14 ,1958.

During the Hashemite era the Iraqi state was not fully hegemonic although it controlled the main sources of state power, the ability to collect taxes, the educational system, the army the war of position and the growth of civil society grew stronger every year. The Hashemites and the allied classes held hegemonic power within the state but not outside of it in, society. In Iraqi

society, the *effendis* were the major force as early as 1936, the year of the first major military coup d'etat against the monarchy. Iraq's "*effendiyya:* was mobilized by nationalism, anti-colonialism and opposition to "feudalism," The hallmarks of progressive Arab nationalism ideology.

The Free Officers were men of modest mean mostly Sunni Arabs, who had gone to state schools and graduated from the Military Academy. They typified the Iraqi "*effendi"* during the monarchy. With military force they were able to sweep away the surface level of Hashemite power and take control of the state apparatus both ideological and coercive, the army, the police, the ministry of information and so forth. It was shocking at how quickly the people rallied behind the new leadership. Markedly, Brigadier General turned Prime Minister Abd al-Karim Qasim opposed "imperialism" and "feudalism" in its currently form in Iraq. The land reform law was quickly able to do away with feudalism in Iraq by breaking up the huge estates and giving the *fellahin* an opportunity to do for themselves.

Iraq rid itself of imperialism, leaving that arch expression of British imperialism in the Nasserist era, the Baghdad Pact. Iraq canceled the Anglo-Iraqi agreement and the Iraqi Air Force took full control of the Habbaniya and Shaiba air bases. The Iraqi government pursued a neutralist foreign policy and undertook positive relations with the Eastern Bloc and the United Arab Republic.

Abdul Nasser and his beliefs clearly influenced the character of the Arab nationalism as employed by Qasim's revolutionary government. This was particularly important in the field of social justice and economic development where the Qasim took cues from Egypt's land reform law to build Iraq's. This development shows that what was particularly important about the

Egyptian Revolution and Gamal Abdul Nasser was not the event and the person in particular but rather what they represented on a regional basis, the breaking of the hegemony of "imperialism" and "feudalism" in Egypt, Jordan and Iraq. This will be further explored in the following and concluding chapter.

CONCLUSION: ANTI COLONIALISM, SOCIAL JUSTICE AND PROGRESSIVE ARAB NATIONALISM 1952-1958.

Progressive Arab nationalism was a phenomenon that swept through the Arab world during the 1950s. It's main proponent and figurehead was the Egyptian Prime Minister Gamal Abdul Nasser but it was though Abdul Nasser's presence was everywhere that Arab nationalists organized for more freedom and better lives. Abdul Nasser and his revolution was a symbol for other Arab nationalists around the Arab world who wanted to affect change in their lives and in their country's lives. Abdul Nasser was the embodiment of a social force that was sweeping through the Arab world as a result of the policies of nation-building and legitimation carried out by regimes who needed popular support for their policies and to operate the state machinery they had built to better serve foreign imperial interests.

This mobilized and participatory social class was the expression of the social forces created by the process of nation-building, the "*effendiyya.*" Arab "*effendis*" were mobilized by the very state constructs they opposed namely the educational system along with the press and radio broadcasting. The petty bourgeoisie functionaries were opposed to the system of privilege, corruption and exclusion above them and were animated by the unorganized peasantry below. They were a civil society apart from the state and the socioeconomic base that was still dominated by "feudalism." The "new" Arab middle class was a small stratum of Arab society but because of their special position as a modernizing, progressive and mobilized bloc they were able to undertake the war of position against hegemonic historic bloc namely the monarchies, the high level politicians, the "feudal" landowners and the ever present British imperial institutions.

In the three states we examined the petty bourgeoisie nationalist was organized either in

civilian organizations or in the case of the young army officers in Free Officers groups. The Wafd party organized the Egyptian "effendiyya" into a politically mobilized group. The Wafd programme was Egyptian Arab nationalism and anti-colonialism with their main goal was the evacuation of the Suez Canal Zone and the end of British "imperialism" over Egypt and Sudan. The parties of the Jordanian National Movement were the locus of "*effendi"* organization against British imperialism, the Arab Legion and General John Glubb. The JNM was made up of many progressive Arab nationalist parties that ranged the spectrum from the Sulayman al-Nabulsi's moderate National Socialist Party to the Jordanian Communist Party. In Iraq, the Baath and the Communists worked together as the parties that represented the urban petty bourgeoisie and its workers. Progressive Arab nationalists in Iraq were opposed to the Hashemite monarchy, the agrarian situation and British imperialism such as the Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1930, the Baghdad Pact and the relationship between the Iraqi government and the Iraq Petroleum Company.

These political parties represented the civilian urban "*effendiyya"* animated as it was by anti-imperialist sentiment, Arab nationalism and Arab unity. But what is fascinating was although the urban petty bourgeoisie were an well-organized and emancipatory bloc they could not be the vanguard of the war of position. The Free Officers groups that existed throughout the Arab world in the wake of the Arab defeat in the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. The Free Officers were also "*effendis"* as they were secondary and college educated government employees and they were exposed to the same Arab nationalist ideology as their civilian counterparts. But what made the Free Officers different is what they had at their disposal which the civilians did not time and the use of military force. The revolutions in Egypt, Jordan and Iraq were popular revolts but only with the use of military force the progressive Arab nationalists able to do away with the *ancien regime.* That also explains why the monarchy was never deposed in Jordan, namely because the

Free Officers and the king were working towards a common goal of "Arabization" of the Arab Legion to make it a better fighting force against Israeli border incursions on the West Bank. The Free Officers were cadres professional revolutionaries that opposed British influence and especially in the Egyptian and Iraqi cases "feudalism."

Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser and General Abd al-Karim Qasim were men of modest means who empathized with the lot of their peasant countrymen and sought to use the power they had wrested away from the monarchies, the landowners and the political elite to make the lives of the *fellahin* better. The aimed to do this by instituting land reform that would redistribute land from the large landowners, give them to the peasantry, and organize the individual plots into agricultural cooperatives. The primary aim of land reform was to end the stranglehold of "feudalism" on the countryside and to give social justice to Egyptian and Iraqi peasants by giving them credit, modern equipment and social infrastructure (sanitation, health, education) to improve their lives. The Free Officers also believed in planned economic development and instituted plans to improve their country's economies such as the building of the Aswan High Dam and renegotiating the terms of the concession with the Iraqi Petroleum Company.

Progressive Arab nationalism effectively changed the relationship between Britain and the Arab would during the 1950s with Abdul Nasser, his allies and their regimes changing the shape of the Anglo-Arab relations that had been in place in some cases as early as the 1830s and 1840s. British informal empire in the Middle East depended on the cooperation of the elite classes, the monarchies, the landowners and the high level politicians as well as agreements amenable to British imperial interests. Such as the Suez Canal Zone concession, the Baghdad Pact as well as the Arab Legion, General John Glubb and the subsidy and finally the Iraqi

Petroleum Company concession. Opposition by civil society, the *"effendiyya"* effectively ended British informal empire in the Arab world by breaking feudalism, privileged concessionary agreements and treaties and by charting a neutralist course in foreign policy. A snapshot of British influence in the Middle East looked in 1958 looked entirely different from the same picture taken in the fall of 1951.

This paper exists in the area where social, economic, political and ideological forces intersect and it is important to reemphasize some of the influences that led this paper to its logical conclusion. The concepts of British imperialism, Arab nationalism, as well as Morton's, Cox' and Gramsci's concepts of international political economy and social relations were explored in detail.

British imperialism in the region was ultimately the reason why Egypt and other Arab states organized themselves as they did as early as 1882 and into the period after World War I. The system of concessions, treaties, base rights, client dynasties, mandates and imperial privilege defined the relationship between Britain and the Arab elites. Concepts drawn both from Hopkins and Cain as well as Robinson and Gallagher can be informative in explaining the reasons for the relationship between British interests and the Arab elite during the 20th century. Robinson and Gallagher stress the importance of free trade as imperialism as well as the issue of the "official mind" of imperialism as accounting for the reasons for British expansion in the Victorian era and in the subsequent years.

The British free trading regime was an ideology that supported its foreign aspirations for world leadership, much like the liberal state at home. The free trading world order emphasized the importance of private interests above those of the state and was an impulse towards expanding Brit-

ish influence over unexplored markets and what Victorian politicians, intellectuals and businessmen saw as "backwards" parts of the world. The other major contribution by Robinson and Gallagher was the concept of the "official mind" of the British Empire. With its emphasis on policy-making as the most important test of what 10 Downing Street, Whitehall, the military and Foreign missions thought as being indispensable in building a British informal empire. The great departments of State accumulated their own massive historiographies in the course of building the empire during the 19th century. The "official mind" of the British Empire can also be read through the process of decolonization of the core of the Arab world. British politicians, policy-makers, bureaucrats and military men were not operating in a vacuum and decisions made throughout the high tide of progressive Arab nationalism influenced each other in the process of letting go of influence in the Arab world.

Hopkins and Cain introduced the gentlemanly capitalism thesis as a way of explaining British informal empire. In the Middle Eastern context, "gentlemanly capitalism" is important as it explains the interplay between economic interests and geopolitical interests. It was the convergence of those two factors that created imperial interest. British political influence in the Arab world was used to gird British economic interests for gentlemen capitalists in the City of London. This was especially the case in Egypt with the Suez Canal and in Iraq and the Iraq Petroleum Company (IPC) concession. In 1882 the British military intervened to keep Khedive Tewfik on his throne after Ahmed Urabi's anti-British rebellion threatened Egypt's ability to service her debt and to maintain free navigation of the Suez Canal. The British would intervene three more times militarily in Egypt (1941, 1951-52, 1956) in order to keep the Suez Canal safe and to maintain the established economic order. Iraq and the IPC was another major piece in Britain's grand "imperial" strategy mainly because of its importance as a source of cheap oil bought with sterling.

Anglo-Iraqi institutions and agreements were created to protect the IPC as an investment, especially the creation of the Mandate for Mesopotamia as well as the subsequent political and military agreements that would nourish the Anglo-Hashemite relationship until July of 1958. For Hopkins and Cain imperialism was a tool used to protect investments made by gentlemen in the City. The British "empire" was not only a geographical entity but a nexus where private and state interests converged to create institutions, regimes, blocs and ultimately hegemony.

Progressive Arab nationalism existed as a way to oppose British imperialism in the Arab world as well as the regimes and institutions that it had either introduced or strengthened in the process. The alliance between British capital, the Arab elite and the landowners ultimately created a situation in the two main agricultural centers of the Arab world where "feudalism" was strengthened in order to better serve the world market, be trade in Egyptian cotton or in Iraqi dates. "Feudalism" undermined the human development of the Arab "*fellahin"* and often made him nothing more than a serf working for meager wages and a subsistence of grain, dates or rice. They were the majority of the population of the Arab world but could not successfully organize to bring meaningful change to their own lives or their countries' political lives, that is where the new Arab "*effendiyya"* enters the picture.

What Cox, Gramsci and authors who favor a new reading of Arab history in the post-Ottoman period stress the importance of the urban Westernized middle stratum of petty bourgeoisie as the most important group in Arab society and politics. The process of state and nation-building requires a portion of the population to make the state function. The progressive Arab nationalist "*effendiyya"* was created by the educational systems of the states they would ultimately bring down. That is the crux of the Gramscian cum Coxian argument that the base (the mode of pro-

duction/feudalism) created both civil society and the state as constituent parts of the superstructure. But since civil society was strong enough as a social force it could mount a war of position against the state and remake the superstructure in their own image. The power of social forces/movements cannot be underestimated in explaining the progressive Arab nationalist moment. The new radicalized, educated and mobilized "*effendiyya"* was the only civil society in these Arab states and by articulating the interests of the unorganized mass of *fellahin* below them were able to change the shape of the state apparatus if not the entire base.

British sponsored feudalism and Arab monarchs were the historic bloc that controlled Egypt, (Trans)Jordan and Iraq as early 1882 and more fully in the wake of World War I. The progressive Arab nationalist "*effendiyya"* opposed this bloc and fought a long war of position to replace it. The new Arab *"effendiyya"* its press, propaganda, educational institutions, political parties and Free Officers groups were a mobilized and emancipatory civil society opposed to the traditional Arab monarchical states. Ultimately the war of position (with some military force) succeeded and the "*effendis"* became the hegemonic bloc in Egypt, (Trans)Jordan and Iraq.

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